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Statutory Prohibitions on the Negotiation of Insurance
Agent Commissions: Substantive Due Process Review
Under State Constitutions
ROBERT H. JERRY, II* AND REGINALD L. ROBINSON**
To market their products, insurance companies for the most part employ
salaried workers (usually referred to by the overinclusive label "insurance
agent") or use a network of independent intermediaries (the so-called "broker"
or "independent agent"). In either case, the compensation of the "agent" (used
here to refer to both the salaried employee and the broker) is a commission paid
by the insurer upon the placing of the insurance. The consumer seeking insur-
ance deals with one or more agents representing various companies. Almost all
of the information that the consumer receives about the coverage and rates will
come from the agent. Once a particular company's product is chosen, the agent
will typically assist the consumer in applying for the coverage.
The consumer seeking the best price for desired coverage may eventually
realize that the agent stands to receive a commission from the company that
accepts the consumer's application. It may occur to the consumer that his total
expenditure for the product will decline if the agent is willing to rebate a por-
tion of the agent's commission to the consumer. Thus, the consumer might
make the following offer to the agent: "I will submit an application through you
to Insurer Z, whom you represent, on the condition that you share with me a
portion of your commission, in the amount of x, in the event my application is
accepted." In almost every state, the consumer's offer will be rejected; the agent
will probably explain that state statutory law prohibits him from rebating to or
sharing with the applicant any portion of his commission. Such an explanation,
if offered, would be correct: in almost every state, an agent who accepted the
consumer's offer would have committed a violation of state statutory law and
would be subject to a civil or criminal penalty.
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If the public's "general welfare" is the standard for assessing the merit of
these statutes, articulating cogent justifications for restricting the ability of the
consumer and the insurance agent to bargain over the agent's commission is
difficult. However, because these statutes help maintain the income of insurance
agents and preserve current methods of insurance marketing, negative assess-
ments of the statutes are not universally shared. The most obvious arenas for
reaching judgments about the merit of these positions are state legislatures,
where these statutes were first enacted. No one disagrees that state legislatures
have the authority to repeal or amend these statutes, and, as a matter of public
policy, it may be wise for legislatures to do precisely that.
However, an equally interesting question is whether and to what extent
these statutes are vulnerable to invalidation on the ground that they are uncon-
stitutional under the due process clauses of state constitutions. This question, in
turn, raises broader questions about the role of the judiciary in a tripartite gov-
ernmental system and the extent to which state constitutions create a model of
interbranch relations varied from that to which we are accustomed under the
federal Constitution. This article uses the state anti-rebate statutes as a vehicle
for addressing these interesting, fundamental questions.
In Part I, this Article examines and categorizes the state statutes that pro-
hibit an insurance agent from returning a portion of his commission for the sale
of the policy to the consumer. Part II discusses substantive due process' in the
state courts. After briefly summarizing the rise and fall of federal substantive
due process, this part explores the use of state constitutions as independent con-
stitutional authority in the area of economic regulation.2 This part concludes
that two distinct models of substantive due process analysis exist in the state
1. The term "substantive due process" has different meanings. See Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,
547-52 (1977) (White, J., dissenting). In this article, the term is used to refer to the standard of review of the
substantive terms of legislation for reasonableness. Although this type of review need not be confined to review of
legislation that regulates economic relationships, the anti-rebate statutes fall into this category, and thus the
phrase "economic due process" could be used to refer to this particular kind of substantive due process review.
Kirby, Expansive Judicial Review of Economic Regulation Under State Constitutions: The Case for Realism, 48
TEm. L. Rav. 241, 246-47 n.19 (1981).
2. The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment has also been used to invalidate economic regu-
lation. See Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277 U.S. 389 (1928) (state tax legislation unconstitutional
because the tax classifications denied businesses equal protection of the laws); Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v.
Coleman, 277 U.S. 32 (1928) (mortgage recording fee and tax classifications violate equal protection); Gulf, C. &
S.F. Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150 (1897) (attorney's fees provisions for certain suits against railroads denies the
railroads equal protection). Review under the due process clause of the fifth and fourteenth amendments and the
equal protection clause is similar; both are substantive in nature. Under the due process clause, the question is
whether the legislation rationally relates to a legitimate governmental end. The same test is used under the equal
protection clause, except that the legislation reviewed in this instance always involves a classification. See gener-
ally Bennett, "Mere" Rationality in Constitutional Law: Judicial Review and Democratic Theory, 67 CALIF. L
Rav. 1049 (1979); J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YouNo, CONsTrruTioNAL LAw 329 (3d ed. 1986). If all
persons are burdened equally by a statute, a due process issue is presented; if a law classifies people into a group
that may exercise a right and a group that may not, the issue is equal protection - whether the classification (the
"means") rationally relates to a legitimate governmental purpose.
The anti-rebate statutes appear to burden all equally. The only apparent classification is that agents are
sometimes allowed, as an exception to the prohibition, to share commissions with other licensed agents. This would
seem reasonable to account for those situations where two or more agents cooperate with another agent to place
the insurance. If disallowing consumers the right to share the commission is an unreasonable classification, it is for
the same reasons that the statute is unreasonable under due process analysis: whether the prohibition itself ra-
tionally relates to a legitimate governmental purpose. To this extent, the equal protection and due process analysis
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courts. Part III comments on two recent cases where the validity of a state anti-
rebate statute was challenged, and evaluates these holdings in light of the mod-
els identified in Part II. Finally, in Part IV, this Article discusses the implica-
tion of the alternative substantive due process models for the anti-rebate stat-
utes in other states.
I. THE STATE STATUTES
A. Substantive Content: An Overview
Forty-nine states and the District of Columbia have a statute prohibiting
insurance agents from rebating a portion of or splitting their commission with
the consumer. Usually, the anti-rebate provision is part of a broader statute
prohibiting unfair trade and marketing practices. In forty-seven states, the un-
fair trade practices statute is modeled on or is similar to the National Associa-
tion of Insurance Commissioners model "Act Relating to Unfair Methods of
Competition and Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices in the Business of
Insurance. ' 3 Section 4 of the NAIC model Act provides:
The following are hereby defined as unfair methods of competition and unfair or de-
ceptive acts or practices in the business of insurance:
S..
H. Rebates. (1) Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, knowingly permitting
or offering to make or making any contract of life insurance, life annuity or accident
and health insurance, or agreement as to such contract other than as plainly expressed
in the insurance contract issued thereon, or paying or allowing, or giving or offering to
pay, allow, or give, directly or indirectly, as inducement to such insurance or annuity,
any rebate of premiums payable on the contract, or any special favor or advantage in
the dividends or other benefits thereon, or any valuable consideration or inducement
whatever not specified in the contract; or giving, or selling, or purchasing or offering to
give, sell, or purchase as inducement to such insurance contract or annuity or in con-
nection therewith, any stocks, bonds, or other securities of any insurance company or.
other corporation, association, or partnership, or any dividends or profits accrued
thereon, or anything of value whatsoever not specified in the contract.'
The NAIC model Act applies to life, health, and accident insurance, but most
states have adopted separate statutes extending the rebate prohibitions to other
lines of insurance, such as fire and casualty.5 The model Act's prohibitions are
overlaps. This article will discuss the issue solely with reference to the due process guarantee. Cf. Kirby, supra
note I, at 250-51, 261-68, 272-77.
3. III NAT'L Assoc. OF INs. CoWo'Rs [hereinafter "NAIC"], MODEL LAWS REGULATIONS AND GUIDEINES
900-1 to 900-17 (1989).
4. Id. at 900-2, 900-4.
5. See Appendix A.
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directed at companies, agents, and brokers.6 A few state statutes also prohibit
the insured from accepting a rebate offered by an agent or broker.7
The anti-rebate statutes, by themselves, are sufficiently broad to prohibit
an insurance agent or broker from sharing a portion of his commission with the
consumer. However, in almost all states the anti-rebate statutes are supple-
mented by "anti-commission-splitting" statutes, which also have the effect of
preventing an agent or broker from sharing a portion of his commission with the
consumer. For example, the Virginia anti-commission-splitting statute, which is
typical of those in other states, regulates commission negotiation by prohibiting
three different activities: payment by the insurer of a portion of a commission to
a consumer; payment by the agent of a portion of his commission earned to a
consumer; and acceptance by consumers who do not have a license to sell insur-
ance of payments from insurers or agents.8 Because most consumers do not pos-
sess valid insurance agent or broker licenses, the statutes have the effect of
prohibiting'consumers from receiving any portion of the commission earned by
the agent or broker who places the insurance.9
Depending on the particular state, these statutes are enforced through vari-
ous civil and criminal sanctions, including license revocation or nonrenewal,
cease and desist orders, revocation of the insurer's certificate of authority, fines,
and sometimes imprisonment. 10
B. Early History of the Statutes
During the post-Civil War nineteenth century, the insurance business, like
most United States industries, experienced dramatic prosperity. Although many
factors contributed to this growth, insurers' aggressive marketing strategies,
which made use of large agency workforces, played a major role in this expan-
sion. The success of the large, aggressive sales forces in generating business
caused insurers to compete intensely for the services of agents by offering them
6. Section 3 of the model Act states that "[n]o person shall engage in this state in any trade practice which
is defined in this Act as... an unfair method of competition or an unfair or deceptive act or practice in the
business of insurance." NAIC, supra note 3, at 900-2. Section 4 of the model Act, a portion of which is quoted
above at text accompanying note 4 supra, defines various unfair methods of competition. Section 2(a) of the model
Act defines "person" as anyone, individual or company, "engaged in the business of insurance, including agents,
brokers, consultants and adjusters." NAIC, supra note 3, at 900-1.
7. See, e.g., AL. CODE § 27-12-14 (1986) (applying to property, casualty, and surety insurance); ALAs ,
STAT. § 21.36.120 (1984) (applying to property, casualty, and surety insurance); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-941
(1986) (applying to fire insurance); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-1122 (1986) (applying to casualty and surety insur-
ance). See generally Appendix A. Kimball and Jackson argued in their 1961 study of rebating and other market-
ing practices that imposing sanctions on the policyholder actually makes the anti-rebate statutes more difficult to
enforce, because this would make it less likely that the policyholder would voluntarily reveal information about
rebating. Because of constitutional immunities from self-incrimination, compelling such disclosures would be im-
possible as well. Moreover, as between the agent and policyholder, the policyholder's culpability would seem to be
much less. For these reasons, Kimball and Jackson recommended elimination of the crime of receiving a rebate.
Kimball & Jackson, The Regulation of Insurance Marketing, 61 CoLUM. L. Rav. 141, 189 (1961).
8. See J. Brock, Baits and Rebates, (paper presented to the Association of Life Insurance Counsel, Dccm-
ber 10, 1963) printed by the Association of Life Insurance Counsel 377, 378 (1964).
9. For the list of states having such a statute, see Appendix A.
10. See Appendix A.
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lucrative fringe benefit and commission packages."' To maximize their own
compensation, many agents practiced high-pressure sales techniques and en-
gaged in unscrupulous behavior. The intense competition among insurers for
agents vested considerable power in the hands of the agents themselves. One
description of this period from the agents' perspective states:
Companies could do nothing to hold the line on either rates or commissions, because
the whole agency system was out of control. If any order went out from an individual
company to its agents, it was: "Get the business, period!" The race belonged to the
swift and the battle to those who could march farthest away from ethical practices as
we know such practices today, but which were then undefined.
As company control more and more declined, agency control more and more as-
cended, until its position became truly dominant.
12
By the turn of the century, abuses in the life insurance industry, where the
post-Civil War growth was most dramatic, were widespread. Payments of exces-
sively large commissions to agents, false representations about future dividends,
waste of company assets on political activities, the inability of some companies
to account for lobbying expenditures, nepotism in the hiring of insurance com-
pany employees, and self-dealing by company officials were all common. Some
of the abuses, such as the payment of excessive commissions, unfulfilled
promises about future dividends, twisting, and rebating, were direct conse-
quences of the intense competition among insurers for agents and among agents
for business. Of these concerns, rebating attracted considerable attention from
policyholders and the industry alike.
Policyholders knew that rebating was a common occurrence,13 and they ob-
jected to rebating for the same reasons they considered other kinds of preferen-
tial treatment to be repugnant. It was unfair, so the objection ran, for some
insureds to receive lower premiums for identical coverage than other insureds
with the same risk characteristics. Although some policyholders no doubt ob-
jected to the inequity, plainly some were angered because they did not receive
favored treatment themselves. In addition, the fact that rebates were offered
also suggested to policyholders that the products being sold to them were not
worth their advertised values. Both criticisms underscored the consumers' ab-
sence of trust in insurers, which was typical of the general public's attitudes in
that era toward concentrations of wealth in any form.
11. For a detailed discussion of the early history of anti-discrimination statutes and the anti-rebate laws in
particular, see H. GRANT, INSURANCE REFORM: CoNSUMER ACTION IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 5-8 (1979). For a
more general discussion of the history of state regulation, see R. JERRY, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 47-80
(1987). One of the chief reasons insurers were able to pay such large commissions can be traced to the successful
marketing of tontine policies. These policies paid dividends only if the insured survived the time period specified in
the contract and kept the policy in force. This enabled insurers to accumulate large amounts of surplus funds
because tontine policies did not require the annual payment of dividends and because lapsed money was not
returned. With the accumulated surplus funds, management could afford to pay high commissions, which agents
could share with customers in the form of rebates. S. KnuIA., INSURANCE AND PUBuC POuCY 123 (1960).
12. W. BENNETT, THE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE AGENTS 12 (1954).
13. One trade journal in the 1880s stated that rebating had become "so general that it may almost be said to
be common to all companies and a majority of agents." H. GRANT, supra note 11, at 9 (quoting Spectator, May
24, 1888).
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From the insurers' perspective, rebating was a costly, disruptive practice.14
Because agents had considerable leverage over the insurers, an agent could ef-
fectively insist that the insurer "make up" in the early years of a policy the
amount of the commission "given away" by the agent to induce the sale. As a
result, the amount of commission paid in the first year (or first few years) of a
policy was much larger relative both to the size of the insured's premium and to
the amount of commissions paid in later years.15 The front-loading of the com-
mission did not reduce the total sum of premiums remitted, but it did require
insurers to borrow against reserves for policies sold in earlier years. If the poli-
cies sold in the earlier years did not lapse, the insurer would eventually collect
enough premium dollars to pay for the high front-end payments given the
agents who sold the newer policies. However, if the older policies lapsed, the
insurer might find itself collecting insufficient funds to pay for the large front-
end commissions. To reduce the risk of these losses, insurers raised premiums,
but this only increased the incentive to give rebates to some insureds. 16 In the
end, insurance became more expensive for those who did not receive rebates.
During the 1880s and 1890s, some agents and professional organizations
dedicated to promoting higher ethical standards for the industry campaigned to
suppress abusive marketing practices, including rebating.1 7 Bills to control re-
bating were introduced in various legislatures, and these efforts bore fruit when
New York passed the first state anti-rebate statute in 1889. By 1895, twenty-
one states had anti-rebate statutes. In that year, thirty life insurance companies
entered into an agreement to discharge any agent found guilty of violating an
anti-rebate statute and to refrain from hiring any such person for a year. Al-
though the agreement collapsed four years later due to the pressures of competi-
tion, the initiative bore witness to the efforts of some within the industry to
promote reform.18
Widespread public distrust of the insurance industry persisted into the
early years of the twentieth century. The most notorious manifestation of this
distrust was an investigation in 1905-06 by a New York legislative committee
chaired by Senator William W. Armstrong, which resulted in the enactment of
reform legislation in that state. Among other things, the New York legislation
imposed stricter regulations on agent commissions. The Armstrong investigation
also prompted a flurry of regulatory activity in other states. By 1930, most state
insurance departments had a fairly broad array of regulatory mandates, includ-
ing the authority to address a wide variety of unfair trade practices, such as
14. GRANT, supra note 11, at 9.
15. First-year commissions sometimes were as high as three-fourths of the first-year's premium. GRANT,
supra note 11, at 8.
16. The large front-end commission also created an incentive for "twisting," which is the practice of inducing
an insured to surrender an existing policy and buy another policy from another company to take its place. The
switch of policy earned a sizeable commission for the agent, but caused a lapse, which made it more difficult for
the insurer of the original policy to fund the large commissions being paid its agents. See GRANT, supra note 11,
at 9-10.
17. GRAr, supra note 11, at 11-15; S. KImBALL, INsuRANcE AND PutLic Poucy 123 (1960).
18. GRArr, supra note 11, at 12-13.
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misrepresentation, discrimination, rebating, and twisting.19 In these early years,
the statutes were subjected to constitutional challenges, usually on the basis
that the statutes bore no relation to public safety or welfare, or were outside the
scope of the state's police powers. However, in each of these cases, the validity
of the statutes was upheld.20
C. Early Justifications for the Statutes
In these early years, much of the public's revulsion at insurance industry
abuses centered on preferential treatment. Sometimes the discrimination was
overt, in that one insured paid a lower price for identical coverage than another
similarly-situated insured. The same effect was obtained covertly when the
agent offered the consumer a promise of money or property in addition to what
was set forth in the insurance contract. Whether the preferential treatment for
one class of insureds was overt or covert, the effect was the same: when an
insurer allowed some members of a similarly-situated class of insureds to pay a
lower premium than other insureds, the insureds who did not.enjoy the benefit
subsidized the others. This was widely perceived as being fundamentally unfair.
Legislators understood that statutory prohibitions on overt discrimination
in coverage and rate structures could be subverted by collateral, preferential
agreements. Their response was to prohibit not only discriminatory rates but
also the practice of charging an identically-situated group of insureds the same
rate while giving some of those insureds a rebate. Thus, the anti-rebate laws
were initially viewed as complementing the anti-discrimination statutes: the
anti-rebate laws promoted the broader anti-discrimination objective by address-
ing covert preferential treatment of some insureds.21 The anti-rebate provisions
were buttressed by provisions in some statutes declaring unenforceable any
agreement between insurer and insured not set forth in the policy of insurance;
if the preferential agreement was inserted in the policy in order to satisfy the
anti-rebate statute, the anti-discrimination ban would be triggered. Of course,
prohibiting unfair discrimination remains one of the central goals of modern
insurance regulation. Thus, it is not surprising that the statutes enacted in the
19. These first statutes combined anti-discrimination provisions with anti-rebate provisions, and it was not
until later that the states separated the anti-rebate language from the anti-discrimination language. When each of
the states passed unfair trade practices legislation in the late-1940s and 1950s, which typically included, as did the
model NAIC Act, an anti-rebate provision, most states did not repeal their pre-existing anti-rebate statutes. This
explains in part why the anti-rebate statutes are currently spread in diverse sections of the state insurance codes.
20. See, e.g., People v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 252 Ill. 398, 96 N.E. 1049 (1911); People v. Formosa, 131
N.Y. 478, 30 N.E. 492 (CL App. 1892); Commonwealth v. Morningstar, 144 Pa. 103, 22 A. 867 (1891).
21. See Greer v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 225 Ala. 121, 142 So. 393 (1932); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. People,
209 Ill. 42, 70 N.E. 643 (1904); Provident Say. Life Assur. Soc'y v. Puryear's Adm'r, 109 Ky. 381, 59 S.W. 15
(1900); Ridout v. Mars, 99 Miss. 199, 54 So. 801 (1911); Bernblum v. Travelers Ins. Co., 340 Mo. 1217, 105
S.W.2d 941 (1937); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Lillard, 118 Okla. 196, 248 P. 841 (1926). This purpose has
been recognized in recent decisions as well. See Public Service Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rosebon Realty Corp., 39 Misc.
2d 663, 241 N.Y.S.2d 555 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1963); Mahone v. Hartford Life & Ace. Ins. Co., 561 P.2d 142 (Okla.
Ct. App. 1976); McDowell v. Good Chevrolet-Cadillac, Inc., 397 Pa. 237, 154 A.2d 497 (1959). Interestingly, one
court stated with candor and enthusiasm that the one purpose of the statute was to protect the livelihoods of
insurance agents. See City of New York Ins. Co. v. Greenwood Int'l Co., 170 Miss. 644, 155 So. 346 (1934).
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early twentieth century to deal with discrimination by insurers remain in force
today.
In addition to the anti-discrimination arguments, opponents of rebating
also argued that unrestricted discriminatory pricing could threaten insurer sol-
vency. If the premium advertised by the insurer is presumed to be fair, reasona-
ble, and sufficient to provide a reserve to meet future claims, giving rebates to
insureds could, in the long-run, prevent the insurer from meeting its obligations.
Thus, if rebating is not restricted, the only way for the insurer to avoid the risk
of insolvency under conditions of widespread rebating is to increase the differen-
tial between preferred and non-preferred insureds. In other words, if the prac-
tice of rebating causes insufficient premiums to be collected to cover anticipated
claims, insolvency can be avoided only if those not enjoying preferred treatment
are charged an excessive, unfair, and unreasonable price.22 When so viewed, it
becomes clear that the insolvency argument was predicated on the discrimina-
tion argument: if preferential benefits are given to one class of insureds, these
benefits will be made up by charging another class of insureds a higher price
than they would have otherwise paid. Thus, by this line of reasoning, it is inevi-
table under conditions of widespread rebating that one group of insureds ends
up subsidizing another class of similarly-situated insureds.
These early justifications for the anti-rebate statutes remained unques-
tioned for many years. During this time, the statutes were applied in a variety
of situations.2 3 Some involved fairly obvious violations,24 but other situations
were more subtle. For example, the statutes were held to invalidate arrange-
ments under which the insured received a highly favorable interest rate on a
loan used to pay the premium.2 5 Similarly, waiving the interest due on a prom-
issory note given in lieu of the first premium payment was held to constitute the
giving of something of value not specified in the policy.2 Putting the insured on
an "advisory board" whose members later shared in distributions not made to
22. See People v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 252 IlM. 398, 96 N.E. 1049 (1911) (explaining rationale for the
Illinois statute).
23. Surveys of the enforcement through the years of the anti-rebate and related statutes can be found in
Brock, supra note 8; Gordon, The Anti-Discrimination Laws-A Survey of the Development and Enforce-
ment-1900-1950, 1950 PROCEEDINGs 34 (Legal Section, American Life Convention); Gordon, The Anti-Dis-
crimination Laws 1950-59, 1959 PaocEEnINos 448 (Legal Section, American Life Convention).
24. See Mountain Fir Lumber Co., Inc. v. Employee Benefits Ins. Co., 296 Or. 639, 679 P.2d 296 (1984)
(oral promise by insurer to rebate premiums unenforceable); 1988 La. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 88-352 (Aug. 26, 1988)
(payment of a finder's fee by an insurance agent to an unlicensed person for referral of a customer is an unlawful
splitting of commission).
25. See Western Union Life Ins. Co. v. Musgrave, 25 Ariz. 219, 215 P. 536 (1923); Johnson v. American
Nat'l Ins. Co., 126 Ariz. 219, 613 P.2d 1275 (CL App. 1980) (alleged contract that insurer would make loan to
insured if insured bought policy is illegal and unenforceable); Jones v. Crawford, 21 Ga. App. 29, 93 S.E. 515 (CL
App. 1917); Morris v. Ft. Worth Life Ins. Co., 200 S.W. 1114 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918). But see Northern Assur.
Co. v. Meyer, 194 Mich. 371, 160 N.W. 617 (1916); Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y v. Robinson, 77 Ohio L. Abs.
18, 147 N.E.2d 648 (Ohio C.P. 1957); Calvin Phillips & Co. v. Fishback, 84 Wash. 124, 146 P. 181 (1915).
26. See Ellis v. Anderson, 49 Pa. Super. 245 (Super. Ct. 1912); Security Life Ins. Co. v. Allen, 170 S.W. 131
(Tex. Civ. App. 1914). In reviewing a twist on this arrangement, the court in Consumer Credit Ins. Ass'n v. State,
149 Vt. 305, 544 A.2d 1159 (1988) held that the state insurance commissioner exceeded his authority in declaring
it an unfair trade practice for issuers of credit insurance policies to make desposits at lower rates of interest than
paid to other depositors, reasoning that this is not an agreement between insurer and insured.
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all insureds was held an unlawful rebate. 7 Other elaborate efforts to route com-
missions to the insured were invalidated as well.2 8
The cases in which the statutes have been applied suggest that rebating
has, and is probably now, occurring to some extent. The significance of the
practice, however, is not quantifiable. What Kimball and Jackson said nearly
three decades ago probably remains accurate today:
Persons who commit the offense of rebating are not anxious to discuss it, and, since no
one is harmed directly, the violation comes to light only in those cases in which a third
person stumbles upon evidence or one of the parties admits his guilt.2 9
Lacking empirical data, Kimball and Jackson nevertheless opined:
That it is difficult to detect and nearly impossible to prove an alleged violation, that
most departments and agents believe there is extensive rebating, and that our own
earlier association with the business convinces us that rebating was common belie the
validity of an inference based solely on the [infrequency] of enforcement proceedings.
We believe that the practice is common and that a large number of agents rebate to
some extent.
3 0
27. See Citizens' Life Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Ins., 128 Mich. 85, 87 N.W. 126 (1901); State Life Ins.
Co. v. Strong, 127 Mich. 346, 86 N.W. 825 (1901); Smathers v. Bankers' Life Ins. Co., 151 N.C. 98, 65 S.E. 746
(1909).
28. Such examples include: (a) a sale of stock in connection with the sale of insurance (Utah Ass'n of Life
Underwriters v. Mountain States Life Ins., 58 Utah 579, 200 P. 673 (1921)); (b) named insureds are trustees of a
corporation wholly owned by them to which the agent's commissions are transferred (Arcim Corp. v. Pink, 253
A.D. 428, 2 N.Y.S.2d 709 (N.Y. App. Div. 1938)); (c) licensing a wholly-owned subsidiary of savings and loan as
insurance agency, which would pay dividends to savings and loan, when evaluated against statutes forbidding
unlawful inducements to purchase of insurance (THM, Ltd. v. Commissioner of Ins., 176 Mich. App. 772, 440
N.W.2d 85 (Ct. App. 1989)); (d) stock option with sale of insurance (People v. Commercial Life Ins. Co., 247 IMl.
92, 93 N.E. 90 (1910)); (e) application for agency license refused, where proposed agent, director of association,
would sell insurance to members of association (whose dues support proposed agent's salary), and would turn over
commissions to association, thereby reducing the amount of dues and assessments to be charged the insureds, on
ground that this is illegal rebate scheme (Lyman v. Ramey, 195 Ky. 223, 242 S.W. 21 (1922)); but see American
Ass'n of Meat Processors v. Casualty Reciprocal Exch., 388 Pa. Super. 179, 565 A.2d 173 (Super. Ct. 1989)
(anti-rebate statutes did not apply to agreement whereby insurer promised to pay ten percent of premiums derived
from workers' compensation insurance sold to Association members, on ground that the Association was neither
insurer, broker, or agent; dissenting judge would hold that this arrangement was an illegal rebate); (f) personal
services contract provided insured in connection with purchase (Richmond v. Conservative Life Ins. Co., 166 Wis.
334, 165 N.W. 286 (1917)); but see Julian v. Guarantee Life Ins. Co., 159 Ala. 533, 49 So. 234 (1909) ("in-
come" refunded to insured is payment for services stipulated for by insurer and insured); (g) a percentage-of-sales
lease agreement between an insurance agent and a landlord who is not licensed to sell insurance (1984 Ariz. Att'y
Gen. Op. No. 184-164 (1984)); (h) the making of a small gift to each person answering a newspaper advertise-
ment containing a coupon to be presented to the insurer whereupon the consumer allows the insurer to compare
the individual's current automobile policy with the insurer's automobile policy (1984 Ga. Att'y Gen. Op. 167
(1984)); but in the same opinion, the anti-rebate statute was interpreted as not prohibiting the insurer making a
charitable contribution to a specified charity based on the total sales of a particular type of policy in one month,
because that incidental benefit goes to a third-party rather than to the insured).
Other arrangements, not all of which have resulted in reported decisions, also seem to fall within the scope of
the statutes. For example, if an attorney representing a client in a real estate transaction refers that client to a
title insurer which issues a policy on property involved in the transaction and then makes a payment to the
attorney in exchange for the referral (see Marcotte, Kickbacks to Lawyers Rapped, 1986 A.B.A. J. 30), this
payment could be viewed as sharing of the title insurance commission with a person who lacks a license to sell
insurance. See Blyth, Guidelines for the Practice of Splitting Title Insurance Premiums Between Title Insurance
Companies and Attorneys in the State of New York, 59 N.Y. ST. BJ, Jan. 1987, at 46-51 (sharing of title
insurance premiums must be based on services rendered, and not on referral).
29. Kimball & Jackson, supra note 7, at 186.
30. Id., at 186-87.
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On the other hand, Frankel stated in his 1983 article that his own "informal
inquiry . . . of some fifty career life insurance agents and staff managers re-
vealed virtually no knowledge of any rebating activity."3 1 But this was coun-
tered by Moyse in 1986 who stated that "[i]t is generally agreed that some
rebating takes place, even though prohibited by law." Although noting that only
a small minority of agents actually rebate, he offered these examples: the
agent paying part or all of the first premium out of his own funds; the agent
paying a renewal premium to prevent a lapse; and commission sharing with
relatives, close friends, and charities with which the agent is personally
involved.32
Part of the difficulty in quantifying the extent of rebating devolves from the
fact that identical formal arrangements may have completely different purposes,
with one constituting a rebate while the other is a legitimate association. For
example, if a policyholder serves on an insurer's advisory board and actually
renders services to the insurer, it is not against public policy to compensate the
policyholder. However, if the policyholder receives an appointment to the board
as an inducement to her purchase of insurance, the purpose of the anti-rebate
law has been offended. In practice, most of the consulting arrangements struc-
tured in the early twentieth century never resulted in the provision of any ser-
vices by the privileged insureds. 33 But an insurer who retains an individual to
provide professional services in circumstances where that individual is coinci-
dentally an insured should not be considered to have violated the statute. Thus,
it is not possible in many instances to determine whether a particular benefit to
an insured is an unlawful inducement to the purchase of insurance without in-
quiring into the circumstances of the transaction. Presumably, if the agent re-
turns cash to the insured in any amount, an unlawful rebate has occurred. But
agents routinely provide other benefits to insureds which may be designed to
induce the purchase or renewal of insurance, and one is justifiably hesitant to
label these sorts of activities - taking the policyholder to lunch, or providing
free calendars and pens - as illegal rebates, even though some of these activi-
ties (such as taking the policyholder out for a round of golf) could have more
monetary value than a modest cash rebate.34 Even if proving that the policy-
holder's benefit induced her purchase of insurance were not difficult, the need
for ad hoc examination of business arrangements where rebating may have oc-
curred calls into question the wisdom of a blanket prohibition.
The difficulty inherent in defining and enforcing no-rebate rules is one of
the reasons the statutes are now being reevaluated. The first significant ques-
tioning of the statutes occurred in 1961 when, as part of a broader study of the
ways in which insurance is marketed, Kimball and Jackson observed: "While
we are not prepared to assert categorically that the anti-rebating laws should be
31. Frankel, Insurance Agent Commission Deregulation: Antirebate Laws and an Alternative to Repeal, 2 J.
INs. REG. 255, 258 (1983).
32. Moyse, Legalized Rebating - A Marketing View, 40 J. Am. Soc'y CLU, 56, 57 (Sept. 1986).
33. Brock, supra note 8, at 388.
34. To help clarify this problem, a 1988 revision to the Kentucky statute made it clear that inducements in
excess of ten dollars were prohibited, but smaller gifts, etc., were permissible. KY. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 304.12-110
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1988).
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repealed ... we do challenge the traditional assumption that such laws are
obviously desirable." 5 In 1977, a Department of Justice Task Force study
called into question the desirability of the anti-rebate statutes .3  In 1981, Rep-
resentative LaFalce, Chairman of the House Small Business General Oversight
Committee, introduced legislation that would have preempted-and thus invali-
dated-every state's anti-rebate law. 7 Although at least two states have consid-
ered repealing their anti-rebate laws, California is thus far the only state to
have done so.
Although it would be premature to describe the criticisms of the statutes as
amounting to a "movement," it is fair to say that the sum of these discussions
represents a substantial reassessment of the rationales for the anti-rebate laws.
D. Modern Justifications for and Criticisms of the Statutes
Today, several justifications are offered for the anti-rebate statutes.3 8 First,
it is still argued today, as it was when the statutes were first proposed, that the
anti-rebate statutes prevent unfair discrimination among insureds with identical
risks. Preventing rate discrimination is a fundamental objective of state insur-
ance regulation, and the underlying value is one of fairness: if two insureds are
similarly situated, those insureds should pay the same amount for their cover-
age. Allowing one insured to pay less than another similarly-situated, insured
means that one insured unfairly subsidizes the other.39
The "unfair discrimination" justification depends in large measure on how
one defines "unfairness." The corollary of "similar insureds should pay the same
rates" is "differently-situated insureds should pay different rates." Yet today
differently-situated insureds often pay the same rates, and this is not widely
considered to be objectionable. In reality, no two risks are identical. In a perfect
world, every risk should be individually evaluated and rated, and a specific pre-
mium charged for the individual rate. Transaction costs, however, make precise
measurement of each insured risk impossible; thus, affordable rates can be of-
fered to the public only if different risks are grouped together for the purposes
of setting a rate. To insist on anything else in the name of "fairness" would
make insurance unavailable. Thus, if one defines fairness as differently-situated
35. Kimball & Jackson, supra note 7, at 192 (emphasis in original).
36. US. DW'T OF JusT. REP. To TASK GROUP ON A NTrrusT IM.MUTEs. TnE PRIcING AND MKTO. OF INS.
301-03 (Jan. 1977).
37. Insurance Agent Commission Deregulation, 1981: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on General Oversight
of the Comm. on Small Business, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) [hereinafter Hearing].
38. For other points of view on the arguments for and against anti-rebate statutes, see Hearing, supra note
37; Frankel, supra note 31; Conniff, Anti-Rebate Statutes after the Florida Litigation: Alternative Controls for
Pricing Abuses, 5 J. INs. REo. 109 (1986). Conniff's article was adapted from an earlier piece written while a
student. See Comment, Insurance Anti-Rebate Statutes and Dade County Consumer Advocates v. Department of
Insurance: Can a 19th Century Idea Protect Modern Consumers?, 9 U. PuoT SouND L. REv. 499 (1986).
39. The anti-discrimination justification was the rationale for the Michigan Attorney General's 1983 opinion
that an insurance agent may not barter contracts of insurance in return for goods or services. The possibility of
incorrect or improper valuation of goods and services provided in lieu of cash created the possibility that policy-
holders may be treated differently in conflict with the intent of the statute. 1983-84 Mich. Att'y Gen. Op. No.
6140 (April 1, 1983).
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insureds paying different rates, it is evident that this kind of fairness is not, and
can never be, achieved.
If one defines fairness according to the corollary proposition that "simi-
larly-situated insureds should pay the same rate," it is likewise evident that this
view of fairness is not, and cannot be, achieved either. Indeed, a certain amount
of discrimination is not only tolerated but also authorized in the industry. Cur-
rently, not all persons pay the same price for the same coverage because group
insurance, direct sales, and mass media merchandising have less costs to the
insurer per policy than individual underwriting, and these reduced costs are
passed along to the consumer in the form of lower rates. Those consumers who
are in a position to benefit from these kinds of marketing devices pay less for
the same coverage than a person who lacks the affiliation essential to participate
in such an arrangement. Curiously, cost savings from more efficient marketing
systems are extended to some consumers without concern for how this might
compromise anti-discrimination goals, but cost savings that might benefit the
consumer from commission deregulation, which is merely another kind of
change in the marketing system, are carefully scrutinized and sometimes criti-
cized for being unavailable to all.
In defense of the anti-discrimination justification, one must note that the
cost-saving aspects of group insurance, direct sales, etc., benefit all members of
the group or all recipients equally. This contrasts with rebating, the benefits of
which could vary from insured to insured, without any necessary relationship to
the cost of serving the insured. Yet, if, as discussed in greater detail below,
commission deregulation encourages the development of alternative sales mech-
anisms such as discount brokerage, one could argue that the cost savings benefit
all who choose to take advantage of the service, just as group insurance, direct
sales, etc., benefit all consumers who choose to utilize the less-costly
alternatives.
In further response to the anti-discrimination justification, it is apparent
that in most other sectors of the U.S. economy, it is common for different prices
for the same product to be charged to different customers. Automobile dis-
counts vary from customer to customer; whether a customer receives a "factory-
rebate" depends on when she makes her purchase. Grocery stores and manufac-
turers of food items routinely issue coupons; this causes consumers to pay differ-
ent amounts for the same food product. It is not true that food coupons are
available to all on an equal basis; some people-particularly the poor-have less
opportunity to purchase newspapers and to develop the purchasing habits
through which one typically acquires coupons. In real estate transactions, con-
sumers pay different percentage-commissions to their sales agents, depending on
whether the consumer attempts to negotiate a reduction in the agent's commis-
sion. In short, our society does not seem particularly troubled when some people
get discounts for their purchases of goods and services but others do not.40 Of
40. Although our survey of public opinion is not scientific, we are comfortable in asserting that most people
outside the insurance business see nothing wrong with purchasing insurance at a discounted price. Most laypeople,
including law students, to whom these prohibitions are mentioned express surprise that such prohibitions exist.
Most agents, on the other hand, express opposition to rebating. Kimball and Jackson made these same observa-
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course, it is likely that large buyers of insurance will obtain larger commission
discounts, but this is true in most sectors of the economy: bulk buyers of prod-
ucts and services can typically negotiate a lower price due to the expenses saved
the seller in not having to deal with several buyers to sell the same quantity."1
Indeed, large consumers of insurance currently negotiate their own policies and
their own rates, and the commission is handled as a part of this negotiation."2
The argument that the anti-rebate statutes prevent discrimination among
similarly-situated insureds has more appeal if one assumes that the rebate of-
fered the insured comes out of the premium collected by the insurer. If, how-
ever, the rebate comes out of the agent's commission, and if the same sum is
remitted to the insurer on the behalf of each similarly-situated insured to pay
for the coverage, each similarly-situated insured is treated equally by the in-
surer. If one views the premium paid by the insured as the sum of two parts,' 3
one part being the fee remitted to the insurer to pay for the coverage and the
other being the agent's commission, and if no part of the rebate comes out of
the fee remitted to the insurer, the anti-discrimination justification for the anti-
rebate laws is actually an argument that fairness requires that similarly-situated
insureds pay their agents equal fees."
This reconstructed argument-that the anti-discrimination ideal requires
similarly-situated consumers to pay equal fees to their insurance agents-is less
compelling than the argument that insurers should not be allowed to charge two
identical insureds different prices for the same product. The commission is es-
sentially the agent's fee for arranging the sale of insurance. Requiring insureds
to pay the same fee to all agents for the sale of an insurance policy is not
obviously different from requiring all people to pay all lawyers the same hourly
fee or proscribing all electricians from price-cutting. Moreover, if the anti-dis-
crimination objective means that insureds with similar costs should pay the
same rate, it follows that fairness is not achieved if Consumer A is required to
pay the same as Consumer B for the agent's services if Consumer A has no
need for those services (i.e., is a lower-cost consumer). If the commission is
simply a brokerage fee, some consumers, in theory, could save that fee by deal-
ing directly with the insurer, such as might occur if the insurer were to provide
a catalog of products and prices and the consumer, without obtaining any ad-
vice or other sales assistance, simply told the insurer what product was desired.
tions in 1961, and the reasons they offered for the divergence of opinion between consumers and agents appear
equally valid today. Agents have an economic self-interest in opposing rebating and to some extent are the prod-
ucts of "professional conditioning" that rebating is bad, while the general public is accustomed to rebates and
discounts for many of their purchases. Kimball & Jackson, supra note 7, at 190.
41. Formisano, Property and Liability Insurance Markets in a "'Net Pricing" Framework, 34 CPCU J. 37
(March 1981).
42. US. DEP'T o F JusT, supra note 36, at 293-94.
43. Currently, consumers do not distinguish the commission being paid from the price for the basic insur-
ance, because the commission and insurance are bundled together, and the consumer is confronted with a single
price.
44. But see Smith v. Kleinschmidt, 57 Mont. 237, 187 P. 894 (1920), where the court, in rejecting the
argument that the prohibition against discrimination applies only to that share of the premium which the insurer
retains for itself, stated: "The agent's commission is as much a part of the premium paid by the assured as is the
portion retained by the insurance company." Id. at 245, 187 P. at 896.
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Commissions are commonly justified as a fee paid by the insured in exchange
for the agent's advice and service. Yet not all consumers need this advice and
service. The anti-discrimination principle actually suggests that only consumers
who need and use the advice should pay for it. Otherwise, consumers who do
not need or want the service of the agent pay for it anyway, thereby subsidizing
those consumers who make use of the service (or contributing to a windfall
profit for the agent who collects a fee for little or no service).45 In short, the
anti-discrimination ideal is less persuasive when used to rationalize forcing con-
sumers to pay equal fees for their agents' services. Taken to its logical conclu-
sion, the anti-discrimination justification tends to support commission
deregulation.4"
A second justification frequently offered for the anti-rebate laws is that the
services provided to consumers by agents would deteriorate in the absence of
such laws. The essence of this justification is a recognition that the commission
is a fee for advisory services provided by the agent. If, it is argued, agents are
under pressure to rebate a portion of their commissions to insureds, agents will
reduce the quantity and quality of advisory services they provide. In the final
analysis, insureds will receive less assistance, information, and advice from
agents, and ultimately will make poorer purchasing decisions. 47
Whether commission deregulation would produce these negative conse-
quences would depend onl the value consumers place on the services provided by
their agents. Presumably, consumers who desire individualized, personal advice
would utilize the services of their current agents, and consumers who do not
want such advice or who do not want to pay for it could utilize the services of a
discount agent. In addition, part of what the consumer would purchase when
paying a higher price to the non-discount agent is the agent's assumption of
legal duties toward the consumer. In many cases, courts have recognized that
agents who undertake to procure insurance for their clients can, depending on
the circumstances, assume contractual, professional, and fiduciary duties to
their clients. Presumably, courts would impose these duties less frequently, if at
45. Whether a broker or agent may accept payments from the insured for additional services rendered in
connection with the placing of insurance has received different answers. The Alaska Attorney General concluded
that the Alaska anti-commission splitting statute did not prohibit a broker or agent from contracting with the
insured and accepting additional compensation from the insured for rendering additional services. Alaska Att'y
Gen. Op. No. J-66-008-82 (Oct. 9, 1981). For a different answer under a different statute, see Ark. Att'y Gen.
Op. No. 83-142 (July 25, 1983). In the course of the Alaska Attorney General's opinion, it was stated that "the
broker may not either refuse to accept the commission paid by the insurer for procuring insurance or refund the
commission paid by the insurer to the insured." Curiously, this approach required the insured to pay a commission
for services that are not used (i.e., that are below the normal usually provided), but allows the broker to charge an
additional fee if the broker's services go beyond the normal services usually provided.
46. A related objection that has been made to the repeal of*anti-rebate statutes is that agents who rebate will
nevertheless have to report their full commission as income and pay tax on the rebated portion of the commission
unless the agent reports the rebate as income to the consumer by using a 1099 form. Moyse, supra note 32, at 57-
58. Because the rebate reduces the income earned by the agent and clearly does not reflect income earned by the
consumer, the rebate is actually a business expense that directly offsets income. The rebate is tantamount to a
reduction in price paid for a service, and the amount of that reduction should not be considered as income to
either the agent or the consumer.
47. For an example of the proffering of this argument, see Mulcahy, Rebates Hike Consumer Costs. Slash
Agent Earnings: Wolff, 90 NAT'L UNDERWRITER LIFE & HEALTH INs. 2 (Sept. 10, 1986) (reporting opinions of
chair of National Association of Life Underwriters task force to preserve anti-rebate statutes).
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all, when consumers utilize discount agents to place their sales.' 8 Those consum-
ers who desire the benefit of the legal obligations that arise when the agent
undertakes to provide advisory services would pay for that benefit. Those con-
sumers who would prefer not to purchase that benefit could utilize a discount
broker, and spend their savings on something of greater utility to them.49
Interestingly, the argument that deregulating commissions will cause dete-
riorated service is analagous to the argument made in opposition to deregulation
of commissions in securities markets, which occurred in 1975. Currently, a con-
sumer who desires advice and counseling on her securities purchases can pay for
that service through a non-discount broker. A consumer who does not want that
service can use a discount broker. The data show that many consumers have
reduced their brokerage commissions by foregoing the counseling for which part
of those commissions pay; the market share of discount brokers has steadily
grown since deregulation occurred over a decade ago. At the same time, the
business of full-price brokers remains substantial, indicating that many consum-
ers are willing to pay the higher fees for the counseling. Presumably, similar
market patterns would emerge if insurance agent commissions were deregu-
lated: many consumers would opt for the full-price agents and their promise of
additional service and counseling, while many other consumers would be at-
tracted to the discount services. Without deregulation, alternative, lower-cost
methods of marketing insurance, which could co-exist with the traditional meth-
ods of marketing, are unlikely to emerge.
A third justification sometimes offered for the anti-rebate statutes is that
the prohibitions on rebates reduce the risk of insurer insolvencies. This argu-
ment had its genesis in the period when some insurers were forced to borrow
against reserves in order to pay for the high, front-loaded commissions promised
to their agents. If the agent gives the rebate out of his commission instead of
the insurer giving the commission out of its premium remittance, the justifica-
tion has no merit. The price which the consumer pays is the gross premium,
which is the sum of the commission plus the net premium. The net premium is
what the insurer must collect to pay losses and maintain adequate reserves, and
this sum should not be reduced when agents rebate a portion of their commis-
sions to consumers. Indeed, agents who purchase insurance for themselves or
their immediate families pay only the net premium; the insurer is no worse off
for this, because the insurer nets as much from the sale of policies to its own
employees as it does from policies sold to third parties.5° Similarly, in property
and liability insurance, the agent often accepts a check from the applicant for
48. Much of the liability now imposed on agents arises in the situation where the agent represents or allows
the consumer to think that the agent will take care of the insured's needs, and the agent exercises unreasonable
judgment in arranging coverages for the insured. When consumers utilize discount agents, who would merely
obtain the coverages designated by the insured, the consumers substitute their own judgment for the agent's, and
this should relieve the agent from liability if inadequate coverages are purchased. Obviously, discount agents could
still be liable, as any agent can be held liable today, for failing to follow the instructions of the consumer.
49. These purchases might, of course, include additional insurance coverages.
50. This was implicitly recognized by the Louisiana Attorney General in a classic "a-half-full-glass-is-not-
the-same-as-a-half-empty-glass" opinion, where the Attorney General concluded that it would be impermissible
for an insurance agency to return a portion of the commission on a workers' compensation policy issued to a school
board on a rebate or fee-split basis, but that if the agency initially offered the premium to the school board at a
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the gross premium, deducts his commission, and remits the net premium to the
insurer. If the agent chooses to reduce his own commission prior to remitting
the net premium to the insurer, the insurer is not affected.
To the extent insurers front-load commissions (that is, to the extent some
insurers today do not adhere to the practice of net premium pricing), the argu-
ment has more relevance. Some life insurers pay in the first year an unusually
large commission to the agent who sells the policy, sometimes as much as the
entire first premium.51 Thus, the agent in the first year has a much larger com-
mission out of which to make a rebate, but in later years the agent has little or
perhaps no commission with which to make a rebate. To the extent rebates are
larger in the first year of some policies than in later years, consumers will be
induced to switch their policies from one insurer to another, taking advantage of
the larger rebates offered in early years.
The responses to the insurer solvency justification for anti-rebating statutes
are several. First, the argument is relevant only to life insurers. Property and
liability insurance is typically written on an annual basis, so "front-load" com-
mission structures do not exist in those lines. Second, some insureds will not
want to switch policies even if larger rebates are offered. An insured who has
developed a health problem may not meet the underwriting requirements for a
new policy, or may do so only at much higher rates. Third, it is virtually incon-
ceivable that insurers would leave existing commission structures intact in a
deregulated environment, particularly if their solvency were at stake. To deter
excessive first-year rebates, insurers need only reallocate some of the agent's
commissions from early years to later years. This might induce agents to put
greater emphasis on servicing policies and keeping them in force than on writ-
ing new policies, but nothing requires that commission structures be heavily
weighted toward payments in the early years of a policy.
A fourth justification for the anti-rebate laws reasons that these statutes
deter the replacement of policies, the widespread occurrence of which would
undermine the savings aspects of whole-life policies.52 Currently, replacement of
one- or two-year old whole-life policies is deterred due to the slightly higher cost
that accompanies advanced age and delayed receipt of cash values, dividends,
and loan values. However, if agents could offer a replacement policy with a
slightly higher premium accompanied by a rebate of half of the agent's commis-
sion, many consumers would choose to replace the policies annually. This would
cause premiums to rise to keep up with the expenses of commissions, while divi-
dends would decline, and this would vitiate the value of the whole-life product.
reduced rate (reflecting a reduction on account of a reduced commission), the arrangement would be valid. La.
Att'y Gen. Op. No. 87-742 (Dec. 23, 1987).
51. Hearing, supra note 37, at 6. (statement of Susan Mitchell, Wisconsin Insurance Commissioner) (first-
year commissions for life insurance are as high as 120 percent of first-year premium). Id. at 49 (statement of
Gordon Bowers, C.L.U.) (normal agency commission is 90 to 120 percent of the first.year premium). Id. (state-
ment of John Regan, C.L.U.) (normal agency commission is 60 to 90 percent of first-year premium). Commissions
in New York are limited to 55 percent of the first-year premium, but expense allowances are voucherable up to an
additional 35 percent of the first-year premium. Id. at 49 (statement of Bowers).
52. This argument is articulated by Frankel, supra note 31, at 261.
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This justification presumes a front-loaded, high first-year commission,
which, as discussed earlier, is by no means inevitable. If such a commission
structure seemed likely to destroy a popular insurance product, it is highly prob-
able that the industry would decrease early-year commissions and increase the
commissions for later years. Assuming a roughly even distribution of commis-
sions over the reasonable life of a policy, no replacement policy will appear
substantially superior, because the agent proposing replacement will not be able
to offer a substantially greater rebate than the agent currently servicing the
policy. Insurers might also opt to price their products at a slightly higher level
in the first year in order to cover the costs of issuing the policy; the reduced
premium in subsequent years would in itself serve as a deterrent to replacement
of the policy.
Those who oppose the statutes also assert disadvantages unrelated to any of
the statute's proferred advantages. Foremost among these criticisms is the alle-
gation that the statutes fix the price that consumers must pay for the services of
insurance agents. The preclusion of price competition reduces the incentive for
agents to compete with each other to provide services to the consumer at a
lower cost. As with any cartel where prices are fixed, competition among the
cartel's members to increase market share may occur through increased service
or improved efficiencies to facilitate increased volume. Some of this competition
may benefit consumers, but the fact remains that not all consumers desire im-
proved service or prefer improved service over a decrease in price. Yet all con-
sumers, including those who do not want the service, must pay a full commis-
sion for the enhanced service regardless of whether the consumer used the
agent's services, the quality of the agent's services, and the amount of effort the
agent expended to arrange the sale. If commissions were deregulated, some
agents would discount their commissions, and this would force other agents to
consider doing so as well. Some would choose not to discount, instead emphasiz-
ing good service as the way to keep their clients. Some would offer rebates, and
would try to maintain their prior level of revenues by making their operations
more efficient and by increasing volume. From the consumer's perspective, de-
regulation would mean more choices. 58
In response to this criticism, one could argue that repealing the anti-rebate
statutes will not provide consumers uninterested in service with a better product
at a lower cost if the repeal is not accompanied by more rigorous regulations
requiring disclosure of insurance costs to consumers. In recent years, a number
of "no-load" financial products have appeared on the market, but critics have
charged that the no-load products do not benefit the consumer because of hid-
den fees. For example, a commission-free life insurance policy is not cheaper to
the consumer if the policy has high surrender charges, which are paid when the
policy is cashed. If the agent rebates a portion of his commission, but recoups
this loss through higher compensation paid by the insurer funded by its receipt
of higher surrender charges, consumers receive no net benefit." Without effec-
53. Estimates of the cost savings to consumers from deregulation of commission pricing range from three
percent to six or seven percent. Hearing, supra note 37, at 3 (statement of Rep. LaFalce).
54. See Wall Street Journal, Jan. 21, 1985, at 24, c. 4.
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tive disclosure of all life insurance costs, and without knowledgeable insureds
making informed comparisons of life insurance products, repealing the anti-re-
bate laws, one could argue, is not likely to yield substantial benefits.
To summarize, the debate over whether anti-rebate statutes should be re-
pealed is vigorous.5 5 In the final analysis, it is difficult to articulate persuasive
arguments commending the statutes. These statutes may eventually be repealed
across the country, but such a development will be years, perhaps a decade or
more, in the future.56
II. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS AND ECONOMIC REGULATION
A. The Federal Doctrine: Its Rise and Fall,
The well-known history of the rise and fall of the federal substantive due
process doctrine needs only a brief sketch here. Suggestions that the judiciary
has an inherent right to review the substance of legislation enacted by the legis-
lative branch date to the early years of the country. Influential political theories
of that era asserted that natural law maxims limited the restrictions on liberty
that any government could impose. From this belief in a set of inherent limita-
tions on governmental authority grew the notion that courts could invalidate
legislative acts that unduly restricted liberty in violation of natural law.5 7 Yet
even at this early time there were proponents of what is now described as judi-
cial restraint. In Calder v. Bull,58 the Supreme Court held that the Connecticut
legislature did not violate the ex post facto clause of the United States Consti-
tution when it set aside a probate decree, because the clause only applied to
criminal laws. Justice Chase, however, expressed the view that the Supreme
Court could invalidate legislation in a proper case if the Court believed that the
legislature had interfered with rights vested in the people by natural law, even if
those rights were not specifically protected by the Constitution. "
Justice Iredell, on the other hand, argued that no legal theory justified giv-
ing a court the power to enforce natural law over the will of the people as
reflected in the legislative acts of their representatives. Only if the acts of Con-
gress or the state legislatures violated specific provisions of the Constitution,
which also reflected the will of the people, could courts step in and invalidate
55. See Arndt, No Consensus on Rebate Threat, 91 NAT'L UNDERWRITER LIFa & HEALTH INS. 28 (Mar. 23,
1987) ("Agent opinion appears to be split on the question of whether the repeal of anti-rebate statutes presents a
serious threat to the life insurance industry."); Van Aartrijk, The Threat to Agent's Turf, 84 BEr's REv. PROP.
CASUALTY INS. 14 (April, 1984).
56. If the insurance industry is rocked sometime in the next several years by widespread insolvencies at a
level equivalent to that which has overrun the savings and loan industry during the 1980s, we should anticipate
substantial federal displacement of traditional state regulation, and federal preemption of state anti-rebate stat-
utes could easily occur in such an environment. In such circumstances, the fate of the anti-rebate statutes would,
of course, be among the very least of our worries.
57. See NOWAK, ROTUNDA, & YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 331-33 (3d ed. 1986); TRIBE, AstsRtcAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 560-61 (2d ed. 1988).
58. 3 U.S. (3 Dali.) 386 (1798).
59. Justice Chase's analysis did not rest on natural law alone, but also invoked a structural limitation inher-
ent in the purposes for which legislatures were established. To this extent, Justice Iredell's critique of Chase's
opinion, discussed below, was off the mark. See L. TRIBE, supra note 57, at 561.
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legislative acts. The debate between Justices Chase and Iredell foreshadowed
the current debate between those who envision courts as authorized to invali-
date statutes whose purpose is economic regulation and those who view courts
as substantially constrained in their ability to review legislative acts.60
In the mid-1850s, Justice Chase's view was accepted in cases at both the
federal and state levels, 61 and the substantive due process doctrine continued to
prosper throughout the rest of the century. 2 Thomas M. Cooley's widely read
and followed treatise Constitutional Limitations,6" which was first published in
1868, gave strong support to the doctrine." In the 1877 decision Munn v. Illi-
nois,6 5 the Supreme Court suggested that the due process clause contained some
implicit but nevertheless inherent restrictions on the economic regulatory au-
thority of legislatures. The Court .rejected due process and commerce clause
challenges to Illinois statutes that regulated the rates grain elevators could
charge. On the due process argument, the Court observed that a state could use
its police power to regulate private property when necessary for the public's
welfare. The grain elevator regulation in question was upheld because the oper-
ation of grain elevators was "affected with a public interest."66 However, the
portent of decisions to come was evident in the court's qualification that
"[u]ndoubtedly, in mere private contracts, relating to matters in which the pub-
lic has no interest, what is reasonable must be ascertained judicially. . . . This
is because the legislature has no control over such a contract. '0 7
In 1887, the Supreme Court explicitly ruled that the substantive due pro-
cess doctrine could be used to test the constitutionality of legislative regulation.
The statute at issue in Mugler v. Kansas,68 which prohibited the sale of alco-
holic beverages, was sustained, but the Court stated that definite limits existed
beyond which the legislature could not go in its regulatory efforts. Moreover,
the Court stated that the judiciary's legitimate role was determining whether
60. See NOWAK, RoTuNDA, & YouNo, supra note 57, at 332; B. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE
CONSrTUTON 33-34 (1980).
61. See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857); Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378
(1856); NowAK, RoTuNDA, & YOuNG, supra note 57, at 332; E. CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT 114-
15 (1948) ("In less than twenty years from the time of its rendition the crucial ruling in [Wynehamer] was far on
the way to being assimilated into the accepted constitutional law of the country.").
62. See, e.g., Loan Association v. City of Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wail.) 655 (1874); Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 68
U.S. (1 Wall.) 175 (1864); TaB, supra note 57, at 562-63.
Although the Supreme Court continued to apply a natural law-based substantive due process analaysis to
strike down legislation during the second half of the nineteenth century, in the period immediately following the
Civil War, the Court refused to read a substantive component into the fourteenth amendment's due process clause.
See, SiEGAN, supra note 60, at 46-55; TIBE, supra note 57, at 564-65.
63. T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONsTITuTIONAL LIMITATIONS WINCH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE
POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION (New York: Da Capa Press repr. ed. 1972) (1868).
64. NOWAK, ROTUNDA. & YOUNG, supra note 57, at 340; SIEGAN, supra note 60, at 45-46.
65. 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
66. Id. at 130.
67. Id. at 134. See also Railroad Commission Cases, 116 U.S. 307 (1886) (regulation requiring railroad to
carry passengers or freight "without reward" amounted to confiscation of property beyond authority of state);
Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1885) (due process clause protected freedom to contract and prevented arbi-
trary deprivations of common-law liberty).
68. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
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and when the legislature exceeded those limits.69 In unmistakeable terms, the
Court indicated it would invalidate a law enacted pursuant to the state's police
power if it had "no real or substantial relation" to the public health, morals, or
safety, and was "a palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental
law." 70
By the turn of the century, the Supreme Court was ready to use substan-
tive due process on a broad scale to invalidate legislation that unreasonably
infringed on liberty.7 1 This era was ushered in by the Court's decision in All-
geyer v. Louisiana7 2 where a Louisiana statute prohibiting any attempt in the
state to effect a contract for marine insurance on Louisiana property with a
company not licensed to do business in Louisiana was invalidated. The Court
held that the statute exceeded the state's police power and violated the four-
teenth amendment's due process clause, in that it infringed upon the liberty to
contract for insurance.
Probably the most famous case of the era of substantive due process activ-
ism was the Supreme Court's 1905 decision in Lochner v. New York. The
New York legislature enacted a statute that limited the number of hours a
baker could work to sixty hours per week or ten hours per day. 4 A majority of
the Court held the law unconstitutional because it arbitrarily and unnecessarily
interfered with the employer's and employee's liberty to contract, a right pro-
tected by the fourteenth amendment. The majority found no legitimate govern-
mental purpose in regulating labor conditions or practices where no health or
safety interest was clearly implicated. Moreover, the majority rejected the argu-
ment that the means chosen by the legislature to protect the health of workers
was rationally chosen. In other words, the Lochner formula required courts to
review both the "ends sought" and "means employed" by economic regulation
legislation challenged under the due process clause. In scrutinizing the "means
employed," the Court insisted upon a "real and substantial relationship" be-
tween the statute and its purposes.75 In assessing the goals of legislation, the
Court insisted that the challenged statute be one that served "the interest of the
public," not the interests of private parties.1 6 Although the majority stated it
would not "substitut[e] the judgment of the court for that of the legislature," 77
perhaps the most telling explanation for the decision was implicit in the Court's
candid observation that "[w]e do not believe in the soundness of the views
which uphold this law."7 8
69. Id. at 661. See also Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897) (due process clause of fourteenth amend-
ment guarantees that a person is free to use his faculties to pursue any kind of employment; Louisiana statute
deprived Allgeyer of liberty to contract, and legislature had no right to do so).
70. 123 U.S. at 661.
71. See TUBE, supra note 57, at 566.
72. 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
73. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
74. Id. at 46.
75. Id. at 56, 64; see also SIEGAN, supra note 60, at 113; TIUB, supra note 57, at 567.
76. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 57.
77. Id. at 56-57.
78. Id. at 61.
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Justices Holmes and Harlan wrote important dissents in Lochner. Justice
Holmes repudiated the activist approach of the majority, stating that the Court
should invalidate a law only when "a rational and fair man necessarily would
admit that the statute proposed would infringe fundamental principels [sic] as
they have been understood by the traditions of our people and our law."79 Jus-
tice Harlan viewed the New York statute as a valid health measure; he cited
evidence supporting the contention that limiting the number of hours bakers
could work would protect the workers, whose health standard was below the
national average.80 Justice Harlan believed that so long as the statute was ar-
guably to protect health, the Court should sustain it.
Three years later, in Muller v. Oregon,81 the Court sustained statutes that
limited the work hours for women. And in 1917, in Bunting v. Oregon8 2 the
Court upheld statutes limiting the work hours for men in certain industries. The
chief difference between these two cases and Lochner was that the advocates of
the statutes in Muller and Bunting, unlike the pro-statute advocates in Lochner,
marshalled the evidence necessary to convince the Court that the legislation was
a proper exercise of the state's police power. Neither Muller nor Bunting ques-
tioned the premise that courts would closely scrutinize the ends sought and
means employed when reviewing the validity of legislative enactments under the
due process clause. In the years that followed, courts, pursuant to this premise,
invalidated numerous federal and state statutes regulating various aspects of the
economy."
In the 1920s, the Court, utilizing the "public interest" test of Munn v.
Illinois, began to invalidate regulatory legislation on the ground that the busi-
nesses subject to the legislation were not affected with a public interest. For
example, in Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations," the Court
reasoned that unless the business either resulted from a public grant or
franchise, was the traditional subject of regulation, or was of a type that had
evolved into the category properly subject to regulation, the state could not reg-
ulate the business. The extreme vagueness of the standard gave the Court al-
most unbridled power to determine the scope of permissible legislative activity;
concomitantly, legislatures had virtually no guidance on what business activities
they could regulate.
The substantive due process doctrine prospered for three decades, but a
1934 decision, Nebbia v. New York,85 foreshadowed its demise. In that case, the
Court upheld a New York statute that established a regulatory board with the
79. Id. at 76.
80. Id. at 71.
81. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
82. 243 U.S. 426 (1917).
83. See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932) (entry into business of ice manufactur-
ing); Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235 (1929) (gasoline prices); Tyson and Brother v. Banton, 273 U.S.
418 (1927) (theater ticket prices); Connally v. Gen. Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926) (regulation of wages of
construction workers); Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921) (state law restricting use of injunctions in labor
disputes); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (state law prohibiting contracts which required workers to re-
frain from union membership as a condition of employment).
84. 262 U.S. 522 (1923).
85. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
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authority to set minimum prices for the retail sale of milk as a legitimate exer-
cise of the state's police power. The Court rejected the argument that the milk
industry was not a business affected with the public interest, stating that "there
is no closed class or category of businesses affected with a public interest. '88
More importantly, the Court appeared to give broad deference to legislative
decisions in matters of economic regulation. It opined that "a state is free to
adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote public
welfare, and to enforce that policy by legislation adapted to its purpose," and
that courts are not authorized either to establish economic policy or to overrule
the legislature's choice of an appropriate policy.87
Although the Court in Nebbia seemed to embrace the logic of Justice
Holmes' dissent in Lochner, the Court after Nebbia continued to invalidate leg-
islation under substantive due process principles. For example, in Morehead v.
New York,88 the Court held unconstitutional a New York statute that estab-
lished a minimum wage for women on the ground that it violated the fourteenth
amendment's protection of liberty to contract. The Court's hostility to legisla-
tive economic regulation was also evident in the series of decisions striking down
various New Deal statutes."9
In the wake of President Roosevelt's unsuccessful effort to pack the Court
in order to facilitate his New Deal legislative agenda, the Court abruptly and
permanently disavowed the substantive due process doctrine as a constitutional
limitation on the legislative regulation of economic relationships. 0 In West
Coast Hotel v. Parrish,"1 a 1937 decision, the Court upheld the constitutionality
of a minimum wage law for women enacted in the state of Washington, even
though fourteen years earlier an identical law for the District of Columbia had
been invalidated.9 2 The Court rejected the argument that the law violated four-
teenth amendment substantive due process and overruled its earlier decision
striking down the District of Columbia law.9 3 A year later, the Court in United
States v. Carolene Products Co. 4 upheld a Congressional statute prohibiting
the interstate shipment of "filled" milk. In response to appellee's due process
challenge, the Court stated that "where the legislative judgment is drawn in
question, [the inquiry] must be restricted to the issue whether any state of facts
either known or which could reasonably be assumed affords support for [the
statute] ."'5 The Court found sufficient facts to support the finding that the stat-
86. Id. at 536.
87. Id. at 537.
88. 298 U.S. 587 (1936).
89. E.g., United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (invalidated Agricutural Adjustment Act of 1933);
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (invalidated wage and hour legislation for coal industry); Rail-
road Retirement Bd. v. Alton R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 330 (1935) (act requiring and regulating pension systems for
railroad employees exceeded Congress' commerce power); Scbecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495
(1935) (invalidated National Industry Recovery Act of 1933 as unconstitutional delegation of power and beyond
scope of commerce power).
90. See TRIBE, supra note 57, at 580-81.
91. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
92. See Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
93. 300 U.S. at 400.
94. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
95. Id. at 154.
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ute had a rational basis, but the Court's rationale went farther, for it declared
that it would uphold legislation if any set of facts, either known or reasonably
inferrable, supported the legislature's judgment. In addition, the Court estab-
lished a presumption favoring the legislative judgment: "the existence of facts
supporting the legislative judgment is to be presumed, for regulatory legislation
affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to be pronounced unconstitu-
tional unless. . it is of such a character as to preclude the assumption that it
rests upon some rational basis . . . ." Other decisions abandoning substantive
due process review quickly followed. 97
Within a decade, the demise of substantive due process was complete. In
Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co.,9 8 where the
Court's 1949 decision upheld the constitutionality of a right-to-work law, Jus-
tice Black specifically noted the rejection of the Lochner doctrine,"" observing
that the states are authorized to legislate against "injurious practices in their
internal commercial and business affairs, so long as their laws do not run afoul
of some specific federal constitutional prohibition, or of some valid federal
law."100 In a 1955 decision, the Court indicated that it not only would presume
that a legislature had a reasonable basis for enacting a particular regulatory
measure, but also would hypothesize reasons for the law's enactment if the leg-
islature failed to articulate the reasons underlying the statute.10' By 1963, it
was hardly necessary for Justice Black to reiterate the demise of substantive
due process, when he stated in Ferguson v. Skrupa:20 2 "We refuse to sit as a
'superlegislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation' . . . . Whether the legisla-
ture takes for its textbook Adam Smith, Herbert Spencer, Lord Keynes or some
other is no concern of ours."' 03
Although there are a few scattered indications that some of the Supreme
Court's justices would like to review the reasonableness of economic legislation,
the presumption of the validity of such statutes remains the overriding princi-
ple.04 In a recent decision, the Court emphasized the limited scope of due pro-
cess review of legislation and reiterated the demise of the means-end form of
substantive due process review:
Although the Court regularly proceeds on the assumption that the Due Process Clause
has more than a procedural dimension, we must always bear in mind that the substan-
96. d. at 152.
97. E.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); Phelps Dodge v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941); United
States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
98. 335 U.S. 525 (1949).
99. Id. at 535-36.
100. Id. at 536.
101. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
102. 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
103. Id. at 731-32 (citing Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952)).
104. See NOWAK, ROTuNDA. & YOUNG, supra note 57, at 358-59. Some commentators and academics have
also suggested that the Supreme Court's abandonment of substantive due process is unfortunate; they advocate
close Supreme Court scrutiny of legislation that affects economic regulation. See, e.g., SIEGAN, supra note 60, at
203; Epstien, Judicial Review: Reckoning on Two Kinds of Error in EcoNoIC LIBERTIES AND THE JUDICIARY,
(J. Dorn & H. Manne, eds. 1987) [hereinafter, EcoNomc LIBERTIES]; Siegan, Rehabilitating Lochner, 22 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 453 (1985); Note, Resurrecting Economic Rights: The Doctrine of Economic Due Process Re-
considered, 103 HARV. L, REV. 1363 (1990).
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tive content of the Clause is suggested neither by its language nor by preconstitutional
history; that content is nothing more than the accumulated product of judicial inter-
pretation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. This is. . . only to underline Mr.
Justice Black's constant reminder to his colleagues that the Court has no license to
invalidate legislation which it thinks merely arbitrary or unreasonable.Y05
Yet, as Professor Tribe has observed, "it is significant that the Court never
wholly abandoned the position that legislatures, at least in their regulatory ca-
pacity, must always act in furtherance of public goals transcending the shifting
summation of private interests through the political process."' ' In fact, an
ever-present, restrained form of substantive due process review was acknowl-
edged by Justice White in his dissent in Moore v. East Cleveland.07 He ac-
knowledged the demise of the means-end form of substantive due process review
of legislative action, but then added:
Even so, "while the legislative judgment on economic and business matters is 'well-
nigh conclusive'. . . ,it is not beyond judicial inquiry." Poe v. Ullman, [367 U.S. 497
(1961)], at 518 (Douglas, J., dissenting). No case that I know of, including Ferguson
v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963), has announced that there is some legislation with
respect to which there no longer exists a means-ends test as a matter of substantive
due process law. This is not surprising, for otherwise a protected liberty could be in-
fringed by a law having no purpose or utility whatsover. Of course, the current ap-
proach is to deal more gingerly with a state statute and to insist that the challenger
bear the burden of demonstrating its unconstitutionality; and there is a broad category
of cases in which substantive review is indeed mild and very similar to the original
thought of Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 132 (1877), that "if a state of facts could
exist that would justify such legislation," it passes its initial test.10
Like a dormant volcano, federal substantive due process review of economic
regulation lurks in the background. Clearly, if what is left of substantive due
process review at the federal level is to ripen into an aggressive form of judicial
oversight like that of the Lochner era, a major reversal in the Court's thinking
would need to occur, much like the abrupt swing which occurred in the late
1930s.' 0 9 Since the impetus for such a swing is unlikely to come from the
right, 1 0 and the left shows no signs of embracing the doctrine, the prospect for
a rejuvenation of substantive due process review at the federal level is remote.
105. Regents of Univ. of Michigan v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225-26 (1985) (quoting Moore v. East Cleve-
land, 431 U.S. 494, 543-44 (1977) (White, J., dissenting)).
106. Tim, supra note 57, at 582.
107. 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (White, J., dissenting).
108. 431 U.S. 494, 547-48. See Kirby, Expansive Judicial Review of Economic Regulation Under State
Constitutions: The Case for Realism, 48 TENN. L. REv. 241, 248-49 (1981) ("As a matter of formal constitu-
tional principles, however, the Court has nursed along enough life to enable a future neo-activist Court to revive
the doctrine for future intervention should state legislatures act unreasonably.").
109. Only once since 1937 has the Supreme Court invalidated a state economic regulation, and that case,
which was decided on equal protection grounds, was subsequently overruled. See Morcy v. Doud, 354 US. 457
(1957), ov'rld by City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976).
110. See Bork, The Constitution, Original Intent, and Economic Rights, 23 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 823, 829
(1986) ("My concern is with the contention that a more general spirit of libertarianism pervades the original
intention underlying the fourteenth amendment so that courts may review all regulations of human behavior under
the due process clause of that amendment. As Judge Learned Hand understood, economic freedoms are philosoph-
ically indistinguishable from other freedoms. Judicial review would extend, therefore, to all economic regulations.
The burden of justification would be placed on the government so that all such regulations would start with a
presumption of unconstitutionality. Viewed from the standpoint of economic philosophy, and of individual free-
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B. State Constitutions as Sources of Independent Constitutional Authority
In recent years, judges, lawyers, and scholars have looked with increasing
interest at state constitutions as an independent source of protection for individ-
ual rights."' Under long-established principles, the Supreme Court does not re-
view state court decisions that rest on an "'independent and adequate state
ground,'" even if the state court also decides an issue of federal law." 2 A state
court is the final arbiter of the meaning of its state's laws, unless the state court
interpretation conflicts with a federal law or regulation.'" In other words, the
supremacy of federal law pares away at the autonomy of state law. When these
principles are considered in the context of state constitutions, a single proposi-
tion emerges: "state constitutions may always be used to supplement or ex-
pand federally guaranteed constitutional rights, but may never be used to un-
dermine or infringe them."" 4
When state constitutional claims are presented to a state court, the interac-
tive relationship of the federal and state constitutions requires the court to em-
brace one of three distinct models of state constitutional jurisprudence. Under
the "primacy model," a state court looks first to the state constitution to deter-
mine whether a right exists; only if a right does not exist does the court look to
the federal constitution for protection against infringement." 5 Under the "si-
multaneous-use" model, the court looks simultaneously to both constitutions and
uses both as a basis for decision. This model should yield the same result as the
primacy model because the state constitutional rationale constitutes an indepen-
dent basis for the decision, and this precludes Supreme Court review. However,
it is likely that the simultaneous-use model creates a tendency for state constitu-
tional doctrine to mirror federal precedents." 6 A third model, a so-called "sup-
plemental" or "interstitial model," requires a court to look first to the federal
dom, the idea has many attractions. But viewed from the standpoint of constitutional structures, the idea works a
massive shift away from democracy and toward judicial rule."). See also, Scalia, Economic Affairs as Human
Affairs, in ECoNOMIC LmERTIEs, supra note 104, at 31-37 (expressing skepticism about the need for or wisdom of
a "revival" of substantive due process in the economic arena at the federal level).
111. See, e.g., BRENNAN, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARv. L. REV. 489
(1977); Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions: Some Random Thoughts, 54 MLss. L.i. 371 (1984); Develop-
ments In the Law-The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARe. L. REV. 1324 (1982) [hereinafter
Developments in the Law]; Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bills of Rights, 9 U. BAIT. L.
REv. 379 (1980); Pollock, State Constitutions as Separate Sources of Fundamental Rights, 35 R'TGERs L. REV.
707 (1983); Comment, Interpreting the State Constitution: A Survey and Assessment of Current Methodology,
35 U. KAN. L. RaV. 593 (1987); Note, The New Federalisn: Toward a Principled Interpretation of the State
Constitution, 29 STAN. L REv. 297 (1977); National Law Journal, Sept. 29, 1986 (special section on State Con-
stitutional Law).
112. M. REDisi, FL ERL. JURISDICTION: TENsIONs IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 261 (2d ed.
1990).
As the Court states the doctrine: "where the judgment of a state court rests upon two grounds, one of which
is federal and the other non-federal in character, our jurisdiction fails if the non-federal ground is independent of
the federal ground and adequate to support the judgment." Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207, 210 (1935).
113. G. TARR & M. PORTER, STATE SUPREME COURTS IN STATE AND NATION 8 (1988).
114. Developments in the Law, supra note 111, at 1334.
115. These approaches are discussed in greater detail in Pollock, supra note 111, at 717-20. See also, Utter,
Swimming In the Jaws of the Crocodile" State Court Comment of Federal Issues When Disposing of Cases on
State Constitutional Grounds, 63 TEx. L. RaV. 1025, 1025-30 (1985).
116. See Pollock, supra note 111, at 718.
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constitution. Only if the challenged restraint is permissible on federal grounds is
the state constitution consulted to determine whether the state affords a greater
right than the federal constitution.1 1"' Despite the differences, each of the three
models recognizes that state constitutions can serve as an independent source of
protections for individual rights and can indeed be less tolerant of infringement
of individual rights than the federal constitution.
C. Substantive Due Process Under State Constitutions
Because state constitutions operate independently to provide protection for
individual rights, the demise of federal substantive due process as a means of
reviewing economic regulation does not ordain sterility in the due process
clauses of state constitutions. The continued validity in state courts of this doc-
trine is not particularly surprising when one considers state courts "relied on
various provisions of their constitutions to protect [economic] rights well before
the U.S. Supreme Court discovered substantive due process ... ."I'l State
courts have responded to the Supreme Court's abandonment of substantive due
process in the economic realm in one of two ways. Some courts have joined the
federal retreat and currently apply a "weak-form" review to economic regula-
tion. Other state courts use a "strong-form" review which evaluates the validity
of economic laws in a manner akin to that which federal courts employed dur-
ing the height of the Lochner era. As the North Dakota Supreme Court stated,
"[fn state courts substantive due process in economic matters has continued to
be used as a ground for decision. It has sometimes been ill but never moribund
... . State courts have never totally relinquished substantive due process as a
permissible ground of decision." 119
1. Weak-Form Review
State courts that have joined the federal court retreat from the substantive
due process doctrine apply a deferential standard when examining whether cer-
tain legislation impermissibly infringes upon economic rights. Using a test that
substantially mirrors the current federal approach, these courts will typically
explore whether there is a reasonable relationship between the legislation and a
117. Id.
118. Galie, State Courts and Economic Rights, 496 ANNALS OF AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLrnCAL AND
SOCIAL SCIENCE 76, 77 (Mar. 1988). In fact many point to a state decision, Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378
(1856), as the "beacon case" in the evolution of the substantive due process doctrine. And while the Supreme
Court was initially hesitant to use the fourteenth amendment to develop economic due process (see supra note 61)
"state courts were quick to add it to their constitutional arsenals." Galie, supra, at 77. See also, SIEoAN, supra
note 60, at 58-59 (Supreme Court's constitutionalization of right to contract in Allgeyer v. Louisiana not unex-
pected "[b]ecause the federal judiciary was in fact following trends already established in many states.").
For a discussion of other factors that may help to explain the continuing vitality of substantive review of
economic legislation at the state level see Hetherington, State Economic Regulation and Substantive Due Process
of Law, (pt. 2), 53 Nw. U.L. Rzv. 226, 248-51 (1958) (courts able to adjust doctrine to local needs and condi-
tions); Paulsen, The Persistence of Substantive Due Process in the States, 34 MINN. L. REv. 91, 117-18 (1950)
(judicial desire to protect citizens from legislation that results from combination of short legislative sessions and
focused interest group pressure).
119. Johnson v. Elkin, 263 N.W.2d 123, 128 (N.D. 1978).
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permissible legislative objective.'2 0 The New Jersey Supreme Court described
the test used by these courts as it upheld a statute that prohibited judicial
spouses from working in casinos: "[A] state statute does not violate substantive
due process if the statute reasonably relates to a legitimate legislative purpose
and is not arbitrary or discriminatory . . . . Briefly stated, if a statute is sup-
ported by a conceivable rational basis, it will withstand a substantive due pro-
cess attack."''
In the same vein is the decision of a Texas court in Massachusetts Indem-
nity & Life Ins. Co. v. Texas State Bd. of Ins. Plaintiff insurer challenged the
constitutionality of a Texas statute that limited, but did not prohibit, the in-
surer's ability to hire temporary licensees. 2 2 The court stated that when faced
with evaluating a due process challenge, both federal and state constitutional
law require the court to search for a rational relationship between the legislative
means and legitimate end.22 The court rejected any notion that the Texas Con-
stitution requires closer scrutiny of economic regulation than does the federal
constitution. "[O]ur review of Texas cases," said the court, "inclines us against
giving any broader scope to [the Texas Constitution's due process provision]
than the federal constitution affords in cases of this kind.' 24
In dealing with state constitutional substantive due process challenges to
economic regulation, the Texas and New Jersey courts apply the same test that
their federal counterparts apply. But not all courts that engage in weak-form
review indicate so clearly that they are in fact applying such a deferential stan-
dard. Some courts claim to apply a "real and substantial relationship" standard
that appears to call for more scrutiny than the federal approach compels. In
fact, these courts apply the same deferential review that current federal doc-
trine yields and courts like those in Texas and New Jersey have adopted.
Illustrative of this kind of case is Coldwell Banker Residential Real Estate
Services, Inc. v. Bishop, where the plaintiff, a subsidiary of Sears, Roebuck &
Company, sought a declaratory judgment that an Ohio statute, which author-
ized the Ohio real estate commission to suspend or revoke the license of any real
estate agent found guilty of "[h]aving offered anything of value other than the
consideration recited in the sales contract as an inducement to a person to enter
into a contract for the purchase or sale of real estate . . "..,,2 The court held,
first, that plaintiff's home buyer's discount program, under which the buyer of a
home through Coldwell Banker would receive a book of coupons permitting the
home buyer discounts on merchandise and services purchased from Sears, did
120. See, e.g., Arizona Downs v. Arizona Horsemen's Found., 130 Ariz. 550, 637 P.2d 1053 (1981);
Carolene Products Co. v. Mohler, 152 Kan. 2, 102 P.2d 1044 (1940); Lee v. Delmont, 228 Minn. 101, 36 N.W.2d
530 (1949); Raisler v. Burlington Northern Railroad Co., 219 Mont. 254, 717 P.2d 535 (1985). For an argument
that all states should have followed this approach see Paulsen, supra note 118.
121. Greenberg v. Kimmelman, 99 N.J. 552, 563, 494 A.2d 294, 305-06 (1985).
122. 685 S.W.2d 104, 114 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. 26 Ohio App. 3d 149, 150, 498 N.E.2d 1382, 1383-84 (1985) (quoting Omo REv. CODE ANN. §
4735.18(N) (Baldwin 1984)).
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not violate the statute, because the discount program was mentioned in the
forms Coldwell Banker used for sales of real estate. 126
The court went further, however, and commented on plaintiff's allegation
that the statute, if interpreted in a manner that proscribed the home buyer's
discount program, was unconstitutional. The court disagreed:
[D]efendants assert that [the statute] furthers the dual purposes of maintaining high
standards of professionalism among real estate brokers and of focusing consumers on
what they are receiving in their purchases of real estate. We find both goals to be valid
attempts at preservation of the general welfare of the public and further find that the
regulation ...bears "a real and substantial relation" to the goals sought to be
obtained.
The character and ethics of real estate brokers are important subjects of govern-
ment regulation. There is a valid state interest in promoting the character, honesty
and intellectual competence of real estate brokers . . . . Likewise, purchasers of real
estate should be aware of all they are receiving in exchange for their purchases. Re-
quiring written disclosure of all consideration a purchaser of real estate is to receive
results in both the prevention of "under the table" dealings by real estate brokers and
a written record of the consideration to be provided a real estate purchaser.127
The court said that in order for economic legislation to withstand a state
constitutional due process challenge the law "'must bear a real and substantial
relation to the object sought to be obtained, namely, the health, safety, morals
or general welfare of the public.' ",2 The court noted further that the reviewing
"'court must be able to say that [the legislation] tends in some substantial de-
gree to the prevention of offenses, or the preservation of the health, morals,
safety or general welfare of the public.' ",12' The stated test would seem to call
for greater scrutiny than would be justified under federal law."30 However, the
court went on to say that "if it is apparent that there is no plausible, reasonable
and substantial connection between the provisions of the act and the supposed
evils to be suppressed, there exists no authority for its enactment.""' Thus,
while the court's statement that it will sustain only those laws that bear a "real
and substantial" relation to the end sought raises the possibility of a somewhat
searching judicial inquiry, the court's additional suggestion that statutes violate
state constitutional due process norms only when there is no plausible means-
end connection is somewhat akin to the federal approach which sustains eco-
nomic legislation if there is a conceivable rational basis for its existence. The
"real and substantial relationship" standard is not always applied in such a
toothless fashion. In some states, the test provides courts with a basis for sub-
jecting economic regulation to searching scrutiny. Such courts have refused to
join the federal court's abandonment of substantive due process; they continue
to examine closely those laws that affect economic rights.
126. Id. at 150-51, 498 N.E.2d at 1384-85.
127. Id. at 152, 498 N.E.2d at 1386.
128. Id. (citing Cincinnati v. Correll, 141 Ohio St. 535, 539, 49 N.E.2d 412 (1943)).
129. Id. (citing Cincinnati v. Correll, 141 Ohio St. 535, 539, 49 N.E.2d 412 (1943)).
130. See supra text accompanying notes 90-110.
131. Id. at 152, 498 N.E.2d at 1386 (citing Cincinnati v. Correll, 141 Ohio St. 535, 539, 49 N.E.2d 412
(1943)) (emphasis added).
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2. Strong-Form Review
A number of state courts review economic legislation in a manner akin to
that employed by the federal courts during the Lochner era. Exemplar of this
approach to review of economic regulation is that advanced by Nebraska courts.
In Louis Finocchiaro, Inc. v. Nebraska Liquor Control Commission,"3 2 plain-
tiff, a licensed liquor wholesaler, sought injunctive relief against the enforce-
ment of a Nebraska "price-posting" statute. The statute effectively limited
wholesalers to two price reductions per item per year.133 Plaintiff challenged the
statute on state constitutional due process grounds. The court stated that such
regulations should be sustained only if there is "some clear and real connection
between the assumed purpose of the law and its actual provisions.' 134 If under
this test it becomes apparent, "that the statute, under the guise of a police regu-
lation, does not tend to preserve the public health, safety, or welfare, but tends
more to stifle legitimate business by creating a monopoly or trade barrier, it is
unconstitutional as an invasion of the property rights of the individual."'' 3 5
Though the test the Nebraska court stated was substantially the same as that
enunciated by the Ohio Supreme Court in Coldwell Banker, the Nebraska
court was more willing to scrutinize in the spirit of Lochner. The court ex-
amined the purported purposes for which the legislation at issue was enacted,
rejected each in turn, and held that the statutory provisions "'[bear] no real or
substantial relationship to the general health, morals, or welfare of the public,'
and are, therefore, unconstitutional . ,, "3 As Finocchiaro demonstrates, the
"real and substantial relationship" test can be a tool for intense scrutiny in the
hands of a court that is willing to so use it.'5 '
Other courts closely scrutinize any economic regulation that reaches indus-
tries not "affected with the public interest." For example, in Batton-Jackson Oil
Co., Inc. v. Reeves,138 the Georgia Supreme Court considered a statute that
made it an unlawful business practice for a distributor to sell a product to one
distributor at retail and to another at a price less than retail.3 9 Using language
reminiscent of that found in Lochner-era Supreme Court decisions, the court
held this statute unconstitutional. Quoting from a 1951 Georgia Supreme Court
decision, the court said "'[t]he right to contract, and for the seller and pur-
132. 217 Neb. 487, 351 N.W.2d 701 (1984).
133. Id. at 488-89, 351 N.W.2d at 702-03. The statute required that 150 days elapse between the end of one
price reduction period and the beginning of another. Thus, it was not possible for liquor wholesalers to reduce
their prices more than twice per year per item. Id.
134. Id. at 490, 351 N.W.2d at 703 (citing United States Brewers' Assn. v. Nebraska, 192 Neb. 328, 220
N.W.2d 544 (1974)).
135. Id. at 491, 351 N.W.2d at 704 (citing Gillette Dairy v. Nebraska Dairy Products Board, 192 Neb. 89,
219 N.W.2d 214 (1974)).
136. Id. at 494, 351 N.W.2d at 706 (quoting Central Markets West v. Nebraska, 186 Neb. 276, 280, 182
N.W.2d 898, 900 (1971) (McCown, Spencer, and Boslaugh, J.J. dissenting)).
137. Under this more rigorous application of the real and substantial relationship test courts are unlikely to
presume the existence of facts under which a statute would further the legislative goal. Developments in the Law,
supra note 111, at 1468. Moreover, some courts applying this standard will invalidate a statute if there is a less
restrictive alternative available for the achievement of the legislative goal. Id. at 1470.
138. 255 Ga. 480, 340 S.E.2d 16 (1986).
139. Id. at 480, 340 S.E.2d at 17.
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chaser to agree upon a price, is a property right protected by the due-process
clause of our [Georgia] Constitution, and unless it is a business "affected with
the public interest," the General Assembly is without authority to abridge that
right.'-"140 The court said that the gasoline industry was not an industry af-
fected with the public interest, because it was not within the category of busi-
nesses "devoted to a public use" with its use thereby, "in effect, granted to the
public."4
A few months later, the Georgia Supreme Court elaborated upon its hold-
ing in Batton-Jackson in the case of Strickland v. Ports Petroleum Co., Inc."2
In Strickland, the plaintiff made a constitutional challenge to a Georgia statute
that prevented the sale of gasoline below cost. The court reiterated its prior
holdings where it had "'unreluctantly' . . . struck legislation that attempted to
regulate and fix prices in industries that are not affected with a public inter-
est."1'" Plaintiffs argued that the statute was simply intended to regulate below
sales costs that tended to create a monopoly or hurt competition. The court did
not agree. "The ultimate goal of the statute," said the court, "is the regulation




The court specifically reiterated Batton-Jackson, "no matter what other states
or the Supreme Court of the United States 'may or may not have decided.' ,,4
The price regulation aspect of the statute offended the court in particular.146
State courts have been particularly willing to invalidate, on state constitu-
tional due process grounds, economic legislation the courts view as anticompeti-
tive. 1 7 State court treatment of state "fair trade" laws is illustrative; these
cases have special significance because of similarities in the economic effects of
the fair trade laws and the anti-rebate statutes. The history of the fair trade
laws date to the 1911 case of Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons
Co., where the United States Supreme Court held that contracts between man-
ufacturers or other suppliers and retail merchants that fixed the price at which
the products could be offered to the consumer amounted to an unlawful re-
straint of trade in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890.148 Such con-
tracts remained illegal until 1937 when, because of an amendment to the Sher-
man Act, states were permitted to authorize "fair trade" or resale price
maintenance.149 Forty-six states enacted resale price maintenance legislation
pursuant to the amendment. 5 0 Typically, the statutes permitted manufacu-
140. Id. at 482, 340 S.E.2d at 18 (quoting Harris v. Duncan, 208 Ga. 561, 67 S.E.2d 692 (1951)).
141. Id.
142. 256 Ga. 669, 353 S.E.2d 17 (1987).
143. Id. at 669-70, 353 S.E.2d at 18 (quoting Williams v. Hirsch, 211 Ga. 534, 535, 87 S.E.2d 70, 71
(1955)) (emphasis in original).
144. Id. at 670, 353 S.E.2d at 18.
145. Id. (quoting Cox v. General Electric Co., 211 Ga. 286, 291, 85 S.E.2d 514, 519 (1955)).
146. Because they operate as blatant limitations on the free market, price regulation provisions are particu-
larly susceptible to invalidation in those courts that engage in serious review of economic regulation. Developments
in the Law, supra note 111, at 1469.
147. Developments in the Law, supra note 111, at 1469-71; Kirby, supra note 1, at 252-54.
148. 220 U.S. 373, 400, 407-09 (1911).
149. H. HOVENKAMP, EcONOMCS AND FEDERAL ANTrrusT LAw § 9.1, at 248 (1985); Fulda, Resale Price
Maintenance, 21 U. Cm. L. REV. 175, 176 (1954).
150. HOVENKAMP, supra note 149, at 248.
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turers and other suppliers of products sold under a trademark, trade name, or
brand name to regulate by contract the price at which their products were sold
at retail.""1 The statutes also contained "non-signer clauses" which created a
cause of action for unfair competition against one who sold the product below
the established contract price, whether or not the seller was a party to the
contract.152
In Old Dearborn Co. Distrib. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., the United
States Supreme Court sustained the Illinois fair trade law in the face of a fed-
eral due process challenge.153 Refusing to view the law as a price fixing statute,
the Court said that the law "permits the designated private persons to contract
with respect [to setting a price]."'51 The Court saw the non-signer clause in the
Illinois law as a valid mechanism for protecting the "property-namely the
good will--of the producer, which he still owns."155 Thus, after Old Dearborn,
state fair trade laws were virtually immune from federal constitutional attack.
In 1975, believing that prices were higher in fair trade states than in other
states,156 Congress removed from the Sherman Act the provision that allowed
states to enact fair trade laws without running afoul of federal antitrust laws.157
Thus, currently, the Sherman Act operates generally to prohibit state legisla-
tures from enacting statutes authorizing resale price maintenance. Many state
courts, however, did not wait for Congress to withdraw the federal authorization
to enact state fair trade laws; these courts used their own state constitutions to
strike down the statutes. By 1956 five state courts had invalidated the laws on
state constitutional grounds.158 By the time Congress had acted to make the
laws invalid under federal antitrust statutory law, a majority of states had al-
ready applied their own constitutions to achieve the same end.1 59 A number of
the courts invalidated the laws on the ground that the non-signer clauses vio-
lated state constitutional due process law.'8 Most of the state courts that invali-
dated the fair trade laws viewed the provisions as "price-fixing statute[s],
designed primarily to destroy competition at the retail level."' 8 ' As some courts
considered the argument that resale price maintenance prevents ruinous compe-
tition that could lead to economic instability or culminate in retail monopolies,
many conceded that the fair trade laws could have been valid when they were
first enacted in the 1930s. These courts concluded, however, that such measures
151. Fulda, supra note 149, at 175.
152. Id.
153. 299 U.S. 183, 190-96 (1936).
154. Id. at 192 (emphasis in original).
155. Id. at 193.
156. HOVENKAMP, supra note 149, at 248.
157. Consumer Goods Pricing Act, 89 Stat. 801 (1975) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 45 (1988)).
158. Note, Counterrevolution in State Constitutional Law, 15 STAN. L. REV. 309, 320 (1963) (citing cases).
159. Kirby, supra note 1, at 253.
160. Note, supra note 158, at 320 (citing cases).
161. Remington Arms Co. v. Skaggs, 55 Wash. 2d 1, 7, 345 P.2d 1085, 1088 (1959) (quoting Skaggs Drug
Center v. Gen. Elec. Co., 63 N.M. 215, 226, 315 P.2d 967, 974 (1957)). "The statutes were then condemned as
having no public purpose." Kirby, supra note 1, at 253 (citing cases).
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
were no longer valid when the economic emergency that led to their passage
subsided.162
The subject of state court treatment of fair trade laws probably deserves
little more than a footnote in the history of state constitutional activity. How-
ever, because one may draw a fair analogy between the invalidated trade laws
and anti-rebate laws, these cases deserve more than passing attention. One of
the current criticisms levelled against the anti-rebate statutes is that they are
anticompetitive.16" Though the insurance provisions do not set prices in the
same way that the fair trade laws allowed manufacturers and other suppliers to
do so, they clearly remove some price competition from the marketplace. Just as
the fair trade laws operated to prohibit retailers from engaging in price compe-
tition in the sale of certain products, so the anti-rebate laws prohibit insurance
agents from using their commissions as a mechanism to engage in price compe-
tition. In both circumstances, price competition is inhibited and the consumer is
the potential loser. Many of the courts that invalidated the fair trade laws did
so even though these courts were willing to concede that adverse economic con-
ditions may have justified the enactment of those laws during the 1930s. A
court currently evaluating the anti-rebate laws could similarly find that while
conditions in the insurance industry may have justified the enactment of the the
anti-rebate laws at the turn of the twentieth century, they should no longer,
given changed circumstances, be allowed to withstand state constitutional scru-
tiny.164 Courts adhering to weak-form review would presumably renounce this
reasoning as untoward judicial activism, but it is noteworthy that the reasoning
state courts employed to invalidate fair trade laws could be applied to strike
anti-rebate laws as well. 6 5
To summarize, courts differ in the extent to which they are willing to re-
view the economic rationality of legislative pronouncements. At the one ex-
treme, some courts give great deference to legislative judgments. At the other
extreme, the Lochner decision is alive and well. The two cases decided thus far
regarding the validity of the anti-rebate statutes exemplify this divergence. In
the spirit of Lochner, a Florida court scrutinized the rationality of a Florida
Statute and found it lacking. Although a critic of that decision would claim the
court substituted its judgment for that of the legislature, in actuality the court
simply employed a stricter level of scrutiny, which the statute was unable to
survive. In a California case, the court applied the more deferential standard of
review, and the statute passed muster under this low level of scrutiny.1,6
162. Note, supra note 158, at 324.
163. See supra text accompanying notes 52-54.
164. See supra text accompanying note 162.
165. For a discussion critical of state court invalidation of fair trade laws see generally Note, supra note 158.
166. Consumers Union of United States v. Btumner, No. 843144 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 15, 1987).
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III. JUDICIAL ASSESSMENTS OF THE STATUTES' VALIDITY
In two cases, courts have assessed the validity of state anti-rebate stat-
utes. 167 In 1986, the Florida Supreme Court decided Department of Insurance
v. Dade County Consumer Advocate's Office,'6 8 where the Florida anti-rebate
statute was invalidated. In 1987, the California Superior Court for the City and
County of San Francisco reached the opposite conclusion with regard to the
California statute in Consumers Union v. Bunner. 69
A. The Florida Litigation
In Department of Insurance v. Dade County Consumer Advocate's Office,
the plaintiffs, the Consumer Advocate's Office and Walter Dartland,17 0 chal-
lenged the constitutionality of two Florida statutes17  that prohibit insurance
agents from negotiating with their clients the amount of their commissions or
offering to rebate a portion of their commissions to their clients. Plaintiffs al-
leged that the statutes violated the due process clause of the Florida Constitu-
tion.17 2 The trial court upheld the statutes as a legitimate exercise of the state
police power, and plaintiffs appealed .
7
The Florida District Court of Appeal reversed. The Court of Appeal ar-
ticulated the standard of review and set forth its conclusion as follows:
The applicable standard of review is whether the challenged anti-rebate statutes rea-
sonably and substantially promote the public health, safety or welfare as required by
the due process clause of the Florida Constitution. To sustain the validity of this exer-
cise of police power there must be shown some rational relation to a legitimate state
interest seeking to protect the public. We are unable to find any legitimate state inter-
est justifying the continued existence of the anti-rebate statutes. 74
The court found unpersuasive various arguments offered by the Department of
Insurance and amici curiae, 75 such as that the statutes were rationally related
167. One attorney general opinion has considered whether the anti-rebate statutes violate the constitutional
safeguards afforded free speech. After the Florida Court of Appeals declared the Florida ant'i-rebate statute un-
constitutional, the Tennessee Insurance Commissioner sought an opinion from the Tennessee Attorney General on
whether the Tennessee anti-rebate statute was a "constitutional restraint on commercial speech." The Attorney
General reasoned that the anti-rebate statute simply required that rebates be disclosed in the policy and did not
actually prohibit them. As such, the statute was a permissible regulation of commercial speech. If, however, the
statute were interpreted so as to prohibit all inducements to the purchase of insurance, the statute would violate
the protections afforded commercial speech by both the federal and state constitutions. If the statute were so
interpreted, the Attorney General was unable to find any link between the statute and a substantial state interest.
Tenn. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 86-016 (Jan. 24, 1986).
168. 492 So.2d 1032 (Fla. 1986). The District Court of Appeal, First District, decision is reported at 457
So.2d 495 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
169. Consumers Union of United States v. Bunner, No. 843144 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 15, 1987).
170. Dartland was the head of the Dade County Consumer Advocate's Office. He alleged that he tried and
failed to get a life insurance agent to rebate part of the commission to be earned on a life insurance policy. 492
So.2d 1032, n. 1 (Boyd, CJ., dissenting).
171. FLA. STAT. §§ 626.611(l1), 626.9541(l)(h)1 (1989).
172. FLA. CONSr. art. I, § 9.
173. 492 So.2d 1032, 1032-35.
174. 457 So.2d 495, 497 (citations omitted).
175. Appearing on behalf of the Department were the Florida Association of Life Underwriters, the Florida
Association of Insurance Agents, and the American Council of Life Insurance, Inc. 457 So.2d 495, 496.
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to the state's interest in guaranteeing insurer solvency and preventing discrimi-
nation among similarly-situated insureds, and that characteristics of the insur-
ance industry-such as low educational qualifications of many agents and the
present-payment-for-future-benefit characteristic of insurance-necessitated
special statutory regulation."" The court saw no relationship between an agent's
freedom to rebate a portion of commissions and insurer solvency, and perceived
no discrimination among insureds so long as the net premium paid by insureds
to insurers (the gross premium being the net premium plus the commission)
remained a constant.11 7 The court reasoned:
The ability of the consumer within a given actuarial class to negotiate for a rebate,
and thereby reduce the overall amount paid for insurance relative to another consumer
in that class, does not constitute undesirable discrimination in a free market economy.
Such price differences have historically been considered fair in every other segment of
our economy.'
The court found plausible the defendants' argument:
that the agent who is permitted to rebate will do so at the expense of his customers, in
that they will not be provided with the quality of information regarding the best type
of insurance suited to their needs because the agent, having negotiated his commission,
will not spend the requisite time counseling his clients. Accordingly, the argument
goes, the public must be protected from low-cost, low-quality service, and the statutes
banning rebating therefore advance a legitimate public interest. 7 9
The court concluded, however, that these rationales did not justify the exercise
of the state's police powers. The court supported this conclusion by referring to
Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Consumer Council,""0 where the Supreme
Court rejected the argument, offered in support of a Virginia statute prohibiting
druggists from advertising the price of their drugs, that the public needed pro-
tection from the evils of advertising because low-cost, low-quality druggists
would acquire customers at the expense of the "good druggists," thereby reduc-
ing the amount of quality services provided by good druggists to consumers.
Although Virginia Pharmacy Board was a first amendment case, the Court felt
that the Florida case presented a similar issue under the due process clause:
The dangers of misuse of information to the consumer by the unscrupulous or indiffer-
ent agent may exist, but the possibilities of such abuse cannot serve to suppress bar-
gaining or information which might otherwise lead to an informed choice. Indeed,
competitive forces at work in the marketplace should generally serve to protect con-
sumers against unfairly discriminatory prices, provided that there is adequate disclo-
sure available to make consumers aware of alternative sources and prices of
insurance.' 8'




180. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
181. 457 So.2d 495, 498.
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Accordingly, the Court held that the anti-rebate statutes "constitute an unjusti-
fied exercise of the police power of this state, and are therefore violative of the
due process clause, Article 1, Section 9, Florida Constitution."' 82
In a 4-3 decision, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the
Florida District Court of Appeal: "We find these statutes unnecessarily limit
the bargaining power of the consuming public and, in accordance with prior
consumer decisions of this Court, we . . hold that these statutes are unconsti-
tutional to the extent they prohibit rebates of insurance agents' commis-
sions." 183 On appeal to the supreme court, the Department first argued that the
district court applied too strict a standard of review in stating that the statutes
must "'reasonably and substantially promote the public health, safety or wel-
fare.' " The court agreed that the appellate court had applied an incorrect
standard of review in part of its opinion, and that the proper standard was the
following:
In considering the validity of a legislative enactment, this Court may overturn an act
on due process grounds only when it is clear that it is not in any way designed to
promote the people's health, safety or welfare, or that the statute has no reasonable
relationship to the statute's avowed purpose.
135
Nevertheless, the court concluded that the lower court's error in articulating the
standard of review did not affect the result: "We find the district court properly
found no relationship between the enactments and any legitimate state interest
and, therefore, it was not called upon to determine the degree to which the anti-
rebate statutes advance a state interest."' 8 6
The court's analysis meant that it necessarily rejected the Department's
and amici curiae's next argument that the statutes "reasonably advance the eco-
nomic protections of Florida consumers" by preventing price discrimination, en-
abling consumers to compare costs of similar policies, preventing consumers
from focusing on the size of the rebate instead of the more important quality of
the coverage, avoiding a spiral of increasing premiums caused by agents' desire
for larger commissions with which to offer larger rebates, and avoiding exces-
sive policy lapse, with its concomitant increases in administrative costs, due to
consumers' replacing their policies with new policies made attractive through
high first-year rebates made possible through prevailing first-year commission
structures. 8 The court found all of these arguments unpersuasive:
"From our review of the record, we find no identifiable relationship between the anti-
rebate statutes and a legitimate state purpose in safeguarding the public health, safety
or general welfare."' 88
The court specifically noted that its decision was consistent with earlier cases in
which it had struck down "laws that curtail the economic bargaining power of
182. Id. at 499.
183. 492 So.2d 1032, 1033.
184. Id. (quoting 457 So.2d at 497) (emphasis added by Court).
185. Id. at 1034.
186. Id. at 1035.
187. Id. at 1033-34.
188. Id. at 1035.
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the public."' 8 9 It observed that it had been one of the first states to hold uncon-
stitutional a "fair trade act" that allowed a manufacturer to mandate a mini-
mum retail price for the retailer's sale of a product to the consumer,190 that it
had struck down a statute prohibiting a public adjuster who represents insureds
from soliciting business,' that it had held invalid a pharmacy board rule
prohibiting the advertisement of the name or price of prescription drugs, 92 and
that it had invalidated a statute prohibiting retail drug establishments from us-
ing the media to promote the use or sale of prescription drugs.193 The court also
cited the United States Supreme Court cases striking down governmental stat-
utes or regulations that restricted the competitive pricing of consumer
services.' 9"
Three members of the court dissented. The essence of the dissenters' disa-
greement with the majority was that the majority had a flawed view of the
judiciary's role in the tripartite governmental structure:
[I]mplicit in the Court's holding are the following propositions: that the courts of Flor-
ida have broad authority to determine whether acts of the legislature serve the public
interest; that courts may generally scrutinize legislation to determine whether it
achieves a stated legislative purpose with sufficient success or precision; and that
courts may nullify laws not shown to serve the public interest to the courts' satisfac-
tion. These propositions are totally erroneous and their application in this case repre-
sents an aggrandizement of judicial power that is antithetical to the basic constitu-
tional doctrine of separation of powers. 9
When confronted with a challenge to legislative regulation of economic activi-
ties and relationships, the dissenters believed the court's role to be "severely
limited":
In order to declare the law invalid, a court must find that the law is simply and abso-
lutely arbitrary, resting on no conceivable rational relation to the public welfare as
determined by the legislature. In evaluating legislation under this "reasonable rela-
tion" test, "we do not concern ourselves with the wisdom of the Legislature in choos-
ing the means to be used, or even whether the means chosen will in fact accomplish
the intended goals; our only concern is with the constitutionality of the means
chosen."19
The dissenters noted the mass of information presented to the court concerning
the need for and the wisdom and effects of the statutes being challenged, and
observed that this information would be better appraised in a debate in legisla-
tive chambers:
It is enough to say that it has clearly been made to appear that there is a fairly
debatable question about whether the legislation bears a reasonable relation to the
189. Id. at 1034.190. Id. (citing Liquor Store v. Continental Distilling Corp., 40 So.2d 371 (Fla. 1949)).
191. Id. (citing Larson v. Lesser, 106 So.2d 188 (Fla. 1958)).
192. Id. (citing Stadnik v. Shell's City, Inc., 140 So.2d 871 (Fla. 1962)).
193. Id. (citing Florida Board of Pharmacy v. Webb's City, Inc., 219 So.2d 681 (Fla. 1969)).
194. Id. (citing Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773
(1975)).
195. 492 So.2d 1032, 1035 (Boyd, C.J., dissenting).
196. Id. at 1036 (quoting Lasky v. State Farm Ins. Co,, 296 So.2d 9, 15-16 (Fla. 1974)).
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achievement of an objective within the scope of the police power. The existence of such
a debatable policy question is sufficient to put an end to all further judicial inquiry in
this kind of case."'
The disagreement between the majority and the dissenters in the Dade
County case reflects a fundamental dispute over the extent to which state courts
can employ substantive due process analysis, grounded in state constitutional
principles, when reviewing the validity of economic regulatory legislation.
In the aftermath of the Florida decision, the Florida Treasurer and Insur-
ance Commissioner interpreted the Florida anti-discrimination statute as requir-
ing an agent who rebates a portion of the commission of a life insurance policy
to make that same rebate available to all of his customers for the policy. Simi-
larly, an agent who rebates a portion of the commission on a property and casu-
alty policy must do so in a manner that is justified by the differing expenses of
different consumers. 198 In effect, the Commissioner treated the commission as
part of the premium paid for the insurance, instead of considering the commis-
sion as an add-on to the basic cost of the insurance, and in doing so, effectively
mooted the deregulatory effect of the court's decision. Because Florida agents
who offer a rebate to one customer must provide the same rebate to all other
customers, commission negotiation between agent and consumer cannot occur,
and there is no ability to price the commission based on the amount of service
provided. As a result, Florida agents are disinclined to offer rebates, and availa-
ble reports indicate that little, if any, rebating is occuring in that state after
Dade County."99
B. The California Litigation
In 1986, Consumers Union of the United States, Inc. ("CU") filed a suit in
the Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco challenging the
constitutionality of three California statutes that together set forth the anti-
rebate principles described above. A trial to the court commenced in June,
1987, and the case was submitted to the court for decision later that month.
While the case was pending, the California legislature passed a statute
which purported to state the "legislative intent" regarding the anti-rebate stat-
utes. This statute, Section 750.1 of the California Insurance Code, provided
that the purpose of all the anti-rebate laws is to avoid insurer insolvencies, un-
fair discrimination that creates subsidies from small to large purchasers, de-
creased quality of service, increased concentration in the distribution of insur-
ance, and misrepresentation and unethical sales practices. This statute
influenced the court in Consumers Union. 00
197. Id. at 1037.
198. Memorandum, Fla. Treas. and Ins. Conm'r (Dec. 30, 1986). In a 1989 opinion letter, the Florida
Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner declared that a rebating plan for which an insurance agency sought ap-
proval which treated all customers alike did not offend Florida insurance laws or regulations. Sheen v. Dept. of
Ins., No. 89-DS-O1JEH, Slip op. at 12 (Jan. 30, 1989).
199. Haggerty, Rebating Unlikely to Become Widespread in California, NAT'L UNDERWRITER, Dec. 5,
1988, p. 19.
200. Consumers Union of United States v. Bunner, No. 843144 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 15, 1987).
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"The issue was whether an insurance agent can engage in rebating has
been presented to the Legislature on prior occasions and, on every occasion, the
Legislative [sic] has rejected attempts to allow agent-rebating to occur in Cali-
fornia. ''2°1 The court quoted from the legislative history which accompanied the
statute and concluded that these were the evils the legislature, in a rational
exercise of its judgment, sought to avoid. The only specific point upon which the
court commented was the testimony of a Florida agent who, while strongly sup-
porting rebating, also mentioned that the rebates would go to the "better and
larger" clients, and not the smaller clients with small policies. The court said:
"This was one of the results the Legislature considered, weighed and rejected
...as against the best interests of the citizens of California, who would be
faced with discrimination in favor of larger purchasers." 202
The court also rejected the discount brokerage analogy:
A point of distinction that must be considered is that discount selling, while a benefit
to the consumer who pays a smaller commission for what he or she buys, also con-
cludes the transaction. What the consumer does with the securities thus purchased is
up to the judgment of the consumer and no further fiduciary duties exist on the part of
the discount broker. In the insurance field, the purchase of insurance is, rather, just
the beginning of the policy relationship. The essence of the insurance agreement is not
what is monetarily saved at the start but what is available to fulfill the contract at the
time the claim is made against the policy.202
The court, of course, overlooked the point that the most important long-term
relationship is between the insurer and the consumer, not the agent and the
consumer. No long-term relationship between agent and consumer need exist,
although the consumer should be free to have such a relationship - and pay for
it - if one is desired. The long-term insurer-insured relationship will be ade-
quately funded if the insurer receives a sufficient net premium to create reserves
for the insured and other insureds grouped with the particular insured. After
the sale is completed, the contract exists between insurer and insured, and the
agent owes no further fiduciary duties with respect to the policy's initiation. If
the agent undertakes to provide future servicing of the policy, the agent may
owe duties, but nothing requires the assumption of such duties.
Although it did not say so expressly, the court clearly gave substantial def-
erence to the legislature's judgment about the merits of anti-rebate statutes. As
for the legislature's rationale for enacting the statute, the court at least con-
ceded that "[e]xtensive testimony was presented on all of these points, with
experts disagreeing on every point." 20" While the court seemed sympathetic to
the statute's objectives, the court ultimately based its decision on a finding that
the legislature's choice of policy had a rational basis: "The legislature had am-
ple evidence to support its findings and decision. There is more than sufficient
evidence to uphold the Legislature as having a rational basis for its decision."20 5
201. Id., Slip op. at 2.
202. Id. at 4.
203. Id. at 3-4.
204. Id. at 3.
205. Id. at 5.
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Consumers Union was mooted in 1988 when Proposition 103's enactment
repealed California's anti-rebate statute. Accordingly, no California appellate
court had the opportunity to review the issues discussed in this case.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although the merit of anti-rebate statutes is much debated, a compelling
case can be made that the statutes, while perhaps in the interests of insurance
agents, are not in the public's interest; the statutes reduce consumer choice,
impair the development of new forms of insurance marketing, and create ineq-
uities by requiring insureds who need no counseling to pay as much for agent
services as those who use the services. The statutes have no necessary relation-
ship to the goal of maintaining insurer solvency. The statutes prevent "discrimi-
nation" in the sense that all consumers must pay a uniform rate for an agent's
services, but this kind of equality has been rejected elsewhere in our economy.
Moreover, the reasons for pursuing the anti-discrimination goal with regard to
agent compensation, as distinct from the compensation paid to the insurer, are
not obvious.
Obviously, any legislature whose members credit the foregoing arguments
could override the judgment of past legislatures by repealing the anti-rebate
statutes. Whether a court should override these past judgments is more prob-
lematic. In some states, substantive due process review of economic regulation is
potent; in other states, substantive due process is as dormant as the federal con-
stitutional doctrine. These two distinct models of review point in opposite direc-
tions: under the strong-form of review found in some states, the anti-rebate stat-
utes are very vulnerable; under the weak-form of review, the statutes pass
muster. These differing outcomes are starkly presented in Dade County and
Consumers Union, where the results turn upon which model of review is
favored.
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Alaba ALA. Code 5 27-12-12 (1909) ALA. Code S 27-7-35 (1989) ALA. Code S 27-12-12(b)
(prohibits rebatee by agent or (prohibits eharing with (1989) (revoke cet. of
company) anyone not licensed) authority of insurer or
license of agent)
ALA. Code 5 27-12-14 (1989) ALA. Code 5 27-8-27 (1989)
(prohibits rebates by company. (prohibits eharing co=n. with ALA. Code S 27-7-34(b)
agent, broker and prohibits anyone not licensed for (1989) (suspension or
insured fron accepting rebate) services as agent) revoked-licensoe for
eharing ccnn. )
ALA. Code 5 27-34-46 (1989)
(prohibits eber of society ALA. Cods 5 27-8-27(b)
fron receiving rebate) (1989) (penalty for
violating 27-8-27 (a) -
fine equal to 3 x co=. or
revoke license)
Alaska Alaska Stat. S 21.36.100 (1989) Alaska Stat. S 21.27-370(a) Alaska Stat. 5
(prohibits anyone from offering (1989) (prohibits sharing 21.27.370(c) (1989)
rebate as inducement) core, by agent to any person (penalty for violation of
other than agent for 21.27.370(a)-suspend er
Alaska Stat. S 21.36.120 (1989) procuring ins.) revoke license)
(prohibits rebates by insurer,
egployos or agent) Alaska Star. 5 21.66.340
(b) insured may not accept (1989) (penalty for
rebate violating
5 21.6.310 S a ant. of
Alaska Stat. 9 21.66.310 (1989) rebate)
(prohibits rebates by insurer,
of ficro, employee, attoney or
agent)
(b) the insured may not accept
rebate
Alaska Stat. S 21.84.480 (1989)
(b) prohibits a member from
receiving a rebate or part of an
agent comm.
Arizona Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 5 20-449 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 5 20- Aiz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 5
(1990) (agent & company for life 311(B) (1990) (prohibits 20-189 (1990) (penalty for
& disability) sharing by agent with anyone violating 20-1585)
not licensed)
Ariz. Rev. Star. Ann. 5 20-451 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. S
(1990) (agent & company - other Ariz. Rev. Star. Ann. 9 20- 20-456(b) (1990) (fine for
than life) 1005 (1990) (prohibits violating 5 20-451)
splitting by title insurer-
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 5 20-1586 penalty 20-1589) Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 5
(1990) (agent or co-pany in 20-IS89 (1990) (violation
title ins.) of 5 20-1586 -
misdemeanor)
Aikansas Ark. Stat. Ann. S 23-66-206 Ark. Stat. Ann. now 5 23-64- Ark. Stat. Ann. 0 23-66-
(1987); 5 66-3005(8) (1980) 224 (1907); 0 23-66-210; 0 210; S 66-3008 (1980)
(prohibits rebates on life, 66-2830 (1980) (prohibits (pnalty for violation 5
health & annuity ins.) sharing by agent with anyone 66-3005: 1) cease & deit
not licensed) order codified; 2) fins -
Ark. Stat. Ann. 5 23-66-308 $500 or $2,500 if person
(1987): S 66-3019 (1980) knew of violation; 3)
(prohibits agent or company from suspension or revocation
offering rebate & person from of license)
accepting)
Ark. Stat. Ann. 0 23-74-140
(1987); 5 66-4739 (1980)
(prohibits rebates in Frat.
Benefit Soc.)
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State Anti-Rebate C o sion Splitting Penalty
California Cal. Ins. Code S 750 (West 1988) Cal. Ins. Code 5 755 (West Cal. Ins. Code S 752 (West
(prohibits .. bar.s by agent or 1988) 1988)
coegany) (splitting w/ unlicensed - (acceptance of rebate =
Rebate) misdemeanor)
Cal. Dix. Code S 751 (West 1988)
(prohibit. agent or copany froc Cal. Ins. Code 5 12404 (West Cal. Ins. Code 5 12409
offering any valuable 1998) (West 1988)
consideration as inducement) (prohibit. co-n, splitting on (Comnissionor can secover
title ins.) up to 5 times the amt, of
the unlawful title ins.
robat., or commission)
Colorado Colo. Rev. Star. 5 10-3-1104 Colo. Rev. Stat. 5 10-2-206 Colo. Rev. Star. 5 10-3-
(M(g)) (1997) (1987) 1108 (1987)
(prohibits rebate.) (com. can be split only with (1) Cease & desist and/ox
licensed in that line of 2) fine and/o 3)
insuzance) Ouepnsion ox revocation)
Connecticut Conn. Gen. Star. Ann. 5 38-245 Coon. G.. Star. Ann. S 38-92 Conn. Gen. Star. Ann. S
West 1987) (West 1987) 38-92 (West 1987)
(prohtbits oebatoe in Prat. (prohibits paying to (fine fox splitting
Benefit Soc. Ins.) unlicensed person by agent ox com. - $500)
company)
Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. 5 38-59
(prohibit. xelae.)
Delaware Del. Code Ann. tit. 18. 5 Del. Code Ann. tit. 18. 5 Del. Code Ann. tit. 18, 5
2304(14) (1989) 1730 (1989) 2308 (1989)
(prohibits person fxom offering (prohibits agent giving (cease & desist or fine or
on life, health & annuity) unlicens.d) suspension ox revocation)
D.l. Cods A nn. tit. 1, 5
2304(15) (1989)
(prohibits robat*, on property.
casualty & Surety)
Del. Code An. tit. 18, 5 6139
)b) (1989)
(prohibits rbates in Frat.
Benefit Societ)
D.C. D.C. Cods Ann. S 35-520 (1981) D.C. Cod. Ann. 5 35-1535 D.C. Cods Ann. S 35-1546
(p.ohibits xebates by agent or (1981) (1981)
company) (prohibits sharing with (fine and or imprisonment)
unlicensed)
Florida Fla. Star. Ann. 8 626.611 (11) Fla. Star. Ann. 5 626.611(11) Fla. Stat. Ann. 5 626.611
(1984) (1984) (1984)
(prohibits rebates by agent) (anyone) (license revocation,
nonrenewal, eligibility)
Fla. Star. Ann. 5 Fla. Stat. Ann. 8 626.753
626.9541(I)(h)1 (1984) (1984) Fla. Star. Ann. 5 626.9581
(pxohibits rebates by agent and (no agent shall divide proe. (1984)
company) w/ othex.) (cease and desist order,
license xev.. etc.)
Georgia Ga. Code Ann. 5 33-6-4(B) (1989) Ga. Cod. Ann. 8 33-23-2(c) Ga. Code Ann. S 33-6-8
(prohibits rebates or other (1989) (1989)
inducements) (prohibits sharing with (penalty for rebate: 1)
unlicensed) cease & desist; 2) fine;
Ga. Code Ann. S 33-9-36 (1989) 3) suspension or
(prohibits ins. co. and agent) revocation)
Ga. Code Ann. 5 33-15-36 (1989)
(prohibit. rebat.s in Fret.
Benefit Soc.)
Hawaii Haw. Rev. Stat. S 431-643 (1985) Haw. Rev. Stat. S 431-398 Haw. Rev. Stat. 5 431-646
(Section 8 _ Anti-Zebate (1985) (1985)
(prohibits sharing by agent (Penalty for violating 5
How. Rev. Stat. 5 434-40 (1985) or company with unlicensed) 431-643- 1) fine; 2)
(anti-rebate in Frat. Benefit suspension or revocation;
Sc.) 3) cease & desist)
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Idaho Idaho Code S 41-1314 (1990) Idaho Code 5 41-1063 (1990) Idaho Code 5 41-1319
(prohibits rebates on life ox (anyone not licensed) (1990)
annuity) (cease & deoit)
Idaho Code 5 41-1073 (1990)
Idaho Code 5 41-2708 (1990) (prohibits consultants from Idaho Code 5 41-117 (1990)
(mae 41-1314 applicable to sharing co .) (violation of cease and
fire in..) desist - S,000/ or Jail 6
=onthe)
Idaho Code S 41-3239 (1990)(prohibit. rebates in Frat.
Benefit Soc.)
Indiana Ind. Code Anni. S 27-1-22-18 Ind. Star. Ann. 5 27-1-155- Ind. Code Ann. S 27-4-1-6
(Burns 1986) 3(d) (Buon, 1986) (Burns 1986)
(prohibits agent from offering) (No co . splitting unless (penalty for violating 5
valid license for that kind 27-4-1-4.
Ind. Cod. Ann. S 27-1-20-30 of ime.) 1) case. & desist; 2)
(Burns 1986) $2,000 - $5,000; or 3)
(prohibits agent or company fr.. suapensio)
offering and insured fro
accepting)
Ind. Code Ann. 8 27-4-1-4(8)
(Burn. 1986)
(inducements are unfair trade
practice)
Ind. Code An. 5 27-11-8-10
(Burn, 1986)
(unfair oompetition statute,
applies to Fret. Benefit Soc.)
Illinois Ill. Ann. Star. tit. 73. 5 763 Ill. Ann. Star. tit. 73. 5 Il. Ann. Stat. tit. 73. 0
(IC S 1551) (Snith-Hurd 1988) 1065.4-1 (IC q 507.1) 764 (IC S 152) (Smith-Hurd
(rebates prohibited) (Smith-Huzd 1988) (no 1980) (elses B
splitting of €oroissions with miedereanor, no
I11. Ann. Star. tit. 73. S 1031 unlicensed) com-mission)
(IC S 424(1)) (Smith-Hurd 1988)
(unfair and deceptive practice 11. Ann. Star. tit. 73, 8
to offer rebates) 765 (IC 5 153) (Srith-Hord
1988) (no person excuood
111. Ann. Stat. tit. 73. 0 926.1 fron terrifying or
(IC 5 314.1) (Soith-Hurd 1988) producing docoments
(rebatee prohibited under relating to violation of
Worker, comp. section) IC 5 151 - imxufoity from
Ill. Ann. Stat. oft. 73.
106.14 (IC S 469) (rebatee Ill. Ann. Stat. tit. 73, 5
prohibited under worker's corp. 1034 (IC 5 427) (Smith-
section) Hood 1988) (cease and
desist order)
Ill. Ann. s0at. tit. 73, 5
1065.18-29 (IC 5 485.1) (Smith-
Hod 1988) (rebates prohibited
in prop. & casualty ins.)
Iowa Iowa Code Ann. 5 507B-4 (West Iowa Code An'n. 507B.7
1988) (West 1988) (penalty for
(pohibits rebates on life, violating 5 507B.4 - fino
annuity, accident or health) op to $50,000. ounpension)
Iowa Code Ann. 0 515A.16 (West Iowa Coda Ann. 5 515A.17
1988) (West 1988) (penalty for
_(prohibits agent or company on violating 515A.16 - fino
fire & casualty ins.) $50S suopension)
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Kensas ,a&n. Stat. Ann. 5 40-941 (1986) an. Star. Ann. 5 40o2419 Ken. Stat. Ann. 5 40-242(prohibits agent or ccany & (1986) (1986)
insured from accepting in fire (may share with licensed (suspension of license
in..) person) or fine (Supp. 1989))
Ran. Stat. Ann. 5 40-1122 (1996) K n. Star. Ann. 40-2407(prohibit. agent or 
€caany & (1986) [1) fine - $100 orinsured fcm accepting in $1,000 (knowingly); 2)
casualty and surety ins.) suspension)
Xan. Stat. Ann. 5 40-2404 (1986)
(prohibits as unfair trade
practice)
Kentucky Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. 5 304.12-090 Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. S 304.9- Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.(Michie/Bobb.-Merill 1988) 350 (Hichi./Bobbs-Msrzill 304.9-440 (Michie/Bobbe-
(giving o receiving) 1988) Merrill 1988)
(prohibits consultant from (suspension or revocation)
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. 5 304.29-540 sharing cc-..)
'Michia/Bobbs-Merrill 1988) Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. 5(repealed 1989; prohibits in Ky. Rev. Stat. 5 304.9-421 304.12-120 (Michie/Bobbe-
Fraternal Benefit So.) (Hichie/Bobbs-Merrill 1988) Merrill 1988)
(prohibits with unlicensed) (violation of anti-rebate
- cease & desist)
Louisiana La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 5 22t1214 La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 5 22:1113 La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 5
(1978) (West 1986) (prohibits as (West 1986) (prohibits with 22:1217 (West 1986)
inducement) unlicensed) ((amended) - penalty for
violation $1,000 per act;
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. S 22:1174 $5,000 intentional)
(West 1986) (prohibits with
unlicensed) La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 8
22:473 (West 1986) ($500
fins)
Mains Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 24-A S Ms. Rev. Stat. tit. 24-A S Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit.
2160 (1990) 1614 (1990) 24-A S 2165 (1990)(prohibits in life & health) (sharing with unlicensed) (Rebate - violation of
unfair practice * cease &M. ROv. Stat. Ann. tit. 24-A S Ms. Rev. Stat. tit. 24-A S desist)
2162 (1990) 1808 (1990)
(prohibits in property, casualty (consultant may not receive)
& surety ins.)
Me Rev. Stat. An. tit. 24-A 5
2163 (1990)
(prohibits person from receiving
rebate)
Me. Rev. Stat. An. tit. 24-A 5
4139 (1990)
(prohibits in Frat. Benefit
Soc.)
Maryland Md. Ins. Code Ann. 5 224 (1989) Md. Ins. Code Ann. 5 167 Md. Ins. Code A n. 5 215
(prohibits on life & annuity) (1989) (1989)
(prohibits with unlicensed) (penalty for violating 8
Md. Ins. Code Ann. S 226 (1989) 224 and 5 226 - cease &
(agent or crany in property, desist)
casualty or surety)
Md. Ine. Code Ann. 5 346 (1989)
(prohibits on Freat. Benefit
Soc.)
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Massachu- Mas. w A. ch. 176D M Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 175 Gaso. Gen. Laws Arm. Ch.
set 3 (west 1990) (prohiits on 51 177 (WeWt 1990) 175 0 177
life, accident, annuity accident (prohibits with nicensed) (co=. haxnig violation
or health) fine of $20 -$200)
Mass. Gen. lAws A n. oh. 175 5 MnS Gen. Laws Ann. oh.
182 (West 1990) (prohibits 176D 5 7 (West 1990)
rebates on any ins. by company (violation of 5 3 - cease
or agent) & doniot) (violation of
this a fine of up to
Mace. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 175 5 $10,000 or revocation or
183 (Weet 1990) (prohibit. euopennion (0 10))
acceptance of rebates)
Michigan Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. 5 500.2024 Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. 5 Mich. Co . Laws A n. s
(Weet 1990) (prohibits on life. 500.1207 (Went 1990) 500.4066 (West 1990)
accident or health) (prohibits unlicensed) (violation of anti-rebate
revoke license for 1 yr
Mieh. Corp. Laws Ann. 5 500.2066 or 5 00.206)
(West 1990) (by agent or
company) Mich. Coup. Laws Ann. 5
500-2069 (Weet 1990)
Mich. Cop. Laws Ann. S 500-2070 (idedeenonor fin. ($100/
(West 1990) (prohibits or prison)
acceptance)
Mich. Co=p. Lawn Ann. 5
500-2070 (West 1990)
(acceptance of rebate -
misdemeanor fine of $100)
Minnesota Minn. Stat. Ann. 5 72A.20 (West Mi=. Stat. Ann. S 60A.17 Mm. Stat. Anf. 5 72A.00
1990) (West 1990) (West 1990) (penalty for
(agent or company prohibited) (prohibits company or agent agent or insured on rebate
sharing with unlicensed) - fine of $60 - $200)Mir Stat. AnnI. 6 72A.08 (West
1990) (prohibits agent or
company from giving and insured
irom accepting)
M . Stat. Ann. 5 72A.12 (West
1990)
(agent or company on life ins.)
Mississippi Mis.s. Code Ann. 5 83-3-121 Miss. Code Ann. 5 83-17-7 Miss. Code Ann. 5 83-17-11
(1990) (1990) (1990)
(agent or company on casualty (prohibits agent or company (co=. splitting penalty
ins. from paying unlicensed) revocation 3-6 months)
Mins. Code Ann. 5 83-7-3 (1990) Miss. Code Ann. 5 83-7-3
(agents or company in life ins.) (1990)
(rebates on life -
revocation 1 yr.)
Missouri Ms. Rev. Star. S 376.500 (1989) Mo. Rev. Stat. $ 370.108 Ms. Rev. Stat. 376.510
(agent or rompany on life ins.) (1989) (1989)
(prohibits company paying (agont violatss 5 376.500
Me. Rev. Stat. 5 375.963 (198) unlicensed) - fine - $530-500
(prohibits rebates) misdeeanor; jail 30 days-
6 coo.)
Mn. ROV. Stat. 5 375.942
(1989)
(cese and desist for S
37S.963)
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Montana Mont. Code Ann. 5 33-18-208 Mont. Cod. Ann. 5 33-17-1103 Mont. Code Ann. 5 33-2-119
(1989) (1989) (resald) (1989)
(prohibits on life. disability & (sharing with unlicensed) (suspend or rsvoksd
annuity) license)
Mont. Code Ann. 5 33-25-401
(ont. Code Ann. S 33-18-210 (1989) Mont. Code Ann 8 33-25-402
(1989) (cannot split title ins. fee (1989)
(agent or cocpany or insured except for ssrvic.s (treble damages and
fr=m accepting on property. perforsd attorney fees for
casualty & surety) violating 8 33-25-401)
Mont. Code Ann. 8 33-7-017 Mont. Code Ann. 5 33-1-318
(1989) (1989)
(prohibits on Frst. Benefit (Cease and dssist ad/or
Sod.) up to $5,000 psr
violation)
Mont. Code Ann. 5 33-25-401
(1989)
(prohibiting rebate on title
ins.)
Nebraska Neb. Rev. s5at. 5 44-361 (1989) Neb. Rev. Star. 8 44-4037 Nab. Rev. Stat. S 44-367
(agent or company and person (1989) (1989)
from accepting) (No com, splitting without (rebate - revocation)
valid license in that line of
Neb. Rev. Star. 5 44-361.01 insurance) Neb. Rev. Star. 5 44-
(1989) 361.02 (1989)(prohibits cirounventing anti- (cirrument anti-zebate
rebate statute) stat. - class V
nisdeeanor )
Neb. Rev. Star. 8 44-1525 (1989)
(prohibits as unfair Neb. Rev. Star. 8 44-1528
oepa tition) (1989)
(violation of 8 44-1525:
1) fine - $1,000 - 5.000;
2) suspension; 3) cease &
desist)
Nevada Nv. Rev. Stat. S 686A.110 Nev. Rev. Star. 5 683A.440 N.V. Rev. Star. 5 683A.450
(1909) (1989) (1989)
(prohibits on life. health & (rom, only to licensed (violation of 8 683A.420:
annuity) person) 1) suspension or 2) fine
25-500)
NeV. Rev. Stat. 5 683A.420 NeV. Rev. Stat. 5 683A.420
(1989) (1989) NOV. Rev. Stat. 5 683A.490
(prohibits paying to unllcensed (prohibits paying unlicensed) (1989)
person) (misdemeanor - for fit
Coom. and red. in at. of
ins. . to s=t. of rebate)
New N.H. Rev. Star. Ann. 5 417.4 N.H. Rev. Stat. 5 402:42
Hampehire (1989) (1989)
(prohibits in title ins.) (violation of 5 402:39 or
8 402:40 - fins up to
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 8 402:39 $2.500 or revocation)
(1989)
(agent & copany)
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New Jersey N.J. Stat. An. S 17.29A-15 N.J. Stat. Ann. S 17:22-6.18 N.J. Star. Ann. S 17830-
(West 1987) (repealed (87)) (West 1987) 20 (West 1987) (cease &
(no rebate. allowed) (anyone unlicensed) desist order up to $5,000/violation)
N.J. Star. Anm. 5 17.298-4 (West
1987) N.J. Star. Ann. 5 17:44A-
(zebates are unfair trade 43 (West 1987) (ponaltien
practice on life, accident and for fraternal benefit)
health in.)
N.J. Stat. -n. S 17B:30-
N.J. Stat. Ann. 5 17B:30-13 17 (rebatno - fine of
(West 1987) $1.000)
(prohibits contracts with
rebates in life, health and
annuity ins.)
N.J. Star. Ann. S 17:46Bo35
(Went 1967)
(no rebates on title ins.)
N.J. Stat. Ann. 5 17:44A-39
(West 1987)
(Fraternal benefits - no
cebates)
New York N.Y. Ins. Law S 6409 (1990) N.Y. Ins. Law 5 2114 (1990) N.Y. Inn. Law 5 6409
(title in.. * prohibits (prohibits com. splitting in (1990)
accepting) Fxat. Benefit SOO.) (accepting rebate on titleins. - $1,000 fine or S x
N.Y. Inn. Law 6 2324 (1990) N.Y. Inn. Law. 6 2115 (1990) rebate (whichevor is
(agent or company) (prohibits com. splitting in greater))
property and casualty ins.)
N.Y. Ins. Law S 4224 (1990) N.Y. Inn. Law 5 2324
(prohibita n accident and N.Y. Inn. Law 5 2116 (1990) (1990)
health by agent or company) (prohibits giving money to (anti-rebate - $500)
unlicensed)
N.Y. Ins. Law 5 2602 (1990)
(prohibits insured froe
accepting rebate)
New Nexico N.H. Stat. Ann. S 59A.16-"S N.N. Star. Ann. 5 59A-12-24 N.M. Stat. Ann. S 59A-16"
(1990) (1990) 1 (1990)(prohibite on life, health & (prohibits sharing with (person who receiven
annuity) unlicensed) rebate - $1,000 fine)
N.H. Stat. Ann. S 59A-16-17 N.M. Stat. Ann. 5 59A-16
°
(1990) 27 (1990)
(prohibits by agent or corpany (cease & desist order)on other ins.) N.H. Stat. A n. 5 59A-16-
29 (1990)
(aenen. fine)
North N.C. Gen. Stat. S 58-33-85 N.C. Gen. Star. 5 5833-25 N.C. Gen. Lawn 5 58-33-45
Carolina (1990) (1990) (1990)
(prohibits agent and company) (prohibits paying unlicensed) (co-. nplitting -
revocation)
N.C. Gen. Stat. S 58-33-90
(1990) N.C. Gen. Laws. 0 58-63-30
(prohibits agent and company On (1990)
life, accident and health) (cease and desist ordor)
N.C. Gen. Stat. 5 58-63-15(0)
(1990)
_______ (prohibite agent and corpany) _______________
1990] NEGOTIATION OF INSURANCE AGENT COMMISSIONS 819
State Anti-Rebate Cosmission splitting Penalty
NOzth N.D. Cent. Code 5 26.1-04-03 N.D. Cent. Code 5 26.1-26-04 N.D. Cent. Code 5 26.1 -
Dakota (1989) (19;9) 26.5 (1989)(prohibits on life. accident and (paying unlicensed) (fine for cotsm. splitting
health) 
- $100 - $1.000)
H.D. Cnt. Cod. 5 26.1-04-05 N.D. Cent. Code 5 26.1-04-
(199) 16 (1989)(agent and company on life ins.) (violation of anti-rebate
class A misdemeanor)




N.D. Cent. Code 5 26.1-25-16
(1909)(prohibits agent and conpany)
Ohio Chio Rev. Code Ann. S 3901.21 Ohio Rev. Cods Ann. 5 3905.05 Ohio Rev. Coda Ann. 5(g) (1) (Baldin 1990) (prohibits (Baldwin 1990) (prohibits 3901.22 (Baldwin 1990)
on Lfe. health and accident) with unlicensed) (violation of anti-zebate
ceass & dssist and fins)
Ohio Rey. Cods Ann. S 3911.20
(Baldwin 1990) (prohibits life Ohio Rev. Cods Ann. Sins. agent froa giving and 3911.21 (Baldwin 1990)
insured from accepting) (violation of S 3911.20 -
revocation of license for
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 5 3933.01 3 years)(Baldwin 1990) (prohibits paying
or receiving) Ohio Rev. Coda Ann. S
3911.99 (Baldwin 1990)
(violation of anti-rbate
fine $500 and 30 days)
Ohio Re. Cods Ann. $
3999.99 (Baldwin 1990)(giving rebate misdemeanor
in 4th dsgrse)
Oklahoea Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 36 5 1204 Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 36 5 Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 36 S
(West 1989) 1424 D (West 1999) 1209 (West 1989)
(prohibits rebates) (sust have valid license for (xestraining order)
such services)
Oil. Stat. Ann. tit. 36 S 2657 Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 36(West 1989) 1420 (West 1989)(prohibits in optometry) (suspension revocation)
Okia. Stat. A n. tit. 36 5 2742(West 1989)
(prohibits in Frat. Benefit
Soc.)
Oregon Or. RaV. Stat. 5 744.015 (1989) Oz. Rev. Stat. 5 744.054-.057 Or. Rev. Stat. 5 731.988
(prohibits paying to unlicensed (1989) (1989)
person) (prohibits with unlicensed) (penalties for violation)
Or. Rev. Stat. 5 746.045 (1989)
(prohibits rehates)
Or. Rev. Stat. S 746.055 (1939)
(prohibits on title ins.)
P nnsyl- Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 40 5 275 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 40 5 274 Pa. Stat. Ann. 5 431
vnia (Purdon 1988) (Purdon 1998) (Purdon 1988)(prohibits agent from paying) (prohibits with unlicensed) (violation of rebate -
fins or jail)
Pa. Stat. Ann. titl. 40 5 276
(Poodon 1986) Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 40 5
(prohibits insred from 1171.9 (Puxdon 19808)
accepting) (cease and desist or
revocation)
Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 40 5 471(Puzdon 1988) Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 40 S
(prohibits agent or company from 1171.11 (Purdon 1988)
offering) (civil penaltis $5,000 if
knew and 1,000 if didn't
knov)
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Rhode R.I. Con. Lawe 5 27-29-4 (1989) R.I. Gen. Laws. 5 27-2-3 R.I. Gen. Low. 5 27-2-4
Zsland (prohibits rebates) (1989) (1989)
(pay ros-. to licensed only) (violation of co=.
R.I. Cen. Laws 5 27-4-6 (1989) splitting - fine $100 -
(prohibits by life ins. agent or $500)
Company)
R.I. Gen. L.we 3 27-29-4.2
R.I. Gen. Laws 8 27-8-7 (1989) (1909)
(agent or conpany on casualty) (violation of 5 29-29-4 -fine of $000)
R.I. Cen. Lawe 8 27-9-44 
(1989)
(agent or cos.pany on casualty) R... Gan. Law. S 27-6-47(1909)
(violation of 8 27-6-46 -
fine $100-500)
R.I. Gon. Laws S 27-8-9
(1909)
($500 fine or jail (I yr))
R.I. Gen. Law. 8 27-9-45
(1989)
(violation of 27-9-44 -
fine $100-$500)
South S.C. Code Ann. S 38-57-130. 0 S.C. Code Ann. S 38-43-200 S.C. Code Ann. 5 30-43-130
Carolina 38-55-50 (Law. Co-op. 1988) (Law. Co-op. 1988) (prohibite (Law. Co-op. 1988)
(prohibits rebates) with unlicensed) (revocation or auoponeion
of licenee)
S.C. Code Ann. 8 38-17-200
(Low. Co-op. 1988) (ca0o
and desist)
South S.D. Codified Laws Ann. 5 58-33- S.D. Codified Lowe Ann. 5 50- S.D. Codified Laws Amn. 0
Dakota 24 (1990) 30-86 (1990) (sharing with 58-33-40 (1990) (ceoe and
(rebates prohibited) unlicensed - class 2 doist order)
misdemeanor)
S*D. Codified Lwe Ann. 5 58-33-
14 (1990)
(rebates on life and health -
class 2 nisdemeanor)
S.D. Codified Laws Ann. 8 58-37-
79 (1990) (hebates on Frat.
Benefit ic olass 2 misdemeanor)
S.D. Codified Laws Ann. 5 58-25-
1 (1990)
(title insurance)
Tennessee Tenn. Code Ann. S 56-8-104 Tenn. Code Ann. S 56-6-149 To.-. Code Ann. 5 S6-8-109
(198) (1989) (1989)
(prohibits rebates) (prohibits paying unlicensed) (eaoe and desist and/or
1) 1.000 violation ($5.009
Tenn. Code Ann. 5 56-35-119 i f intentional):
(1989) 2) euspension or
(prohibits applicant from rebate revocation)
on title ins.)
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Texas Tex. Ins. Code Ann. S 21.21 Tex. Ins. Code Ann. 5 21.07 TeX. Ins. Code Ann. 5 5.20
(Venon 1989) (Venon 1989) (prohibits (Vernon 1989) (rebate on
(prohibits rebates on life, paying unlicensed) casualty - revocation of
health accident) license and fine)
Tee. Ins. Code Ann. 8 5.09 Tex. Ins. Code Ann. 5
(Vernon 1989) 541.-l (Vernon 1989)
(agent or company on mtor (receiving rebate on fire
vehicle ins.) ins. fine $100 or 90 days)
Tex. Ins. code Ann. S 5.20 Tex. Ins. Code Ann. 8
[Vernon 1989) 21.26 (Vernon 1989) (cease
(agent or crpany on casualty and desist order)
ine. )
Tex. Ins. Code Ann. 5 S.41
(Vernon 1989)
(agent or company on fire)
Tee. Ins. Code Arn. S 9.30
(Vernon 1989)
(prohibits rebates on title
ins.)
Tex. Ins. Code Ann. 9 24.14
(Vernon 1989)
(premiun fin. Co. cannot rebate)
Utah Utah Code Ann. S 31A-23- Utah Code Ann. S 31A-23-404 Utah Code Ann. S 31A-2-308
302(2) (a) (1990) (1990) (1990)
(prohibits rebates) (prohibits sharing with (penalty is (1) (a) forfeit
unlicensed) twice the ant. of profit
(b) $1,000 S violation (c)
each day is a separate
viol. (2) restraining
order)
Utah Code Ann. S 31A-23-
216 (1990) (revoke
license)
Ve nt Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 8 S 4724 Vt. Star. Ann. tit. 8 8 4696 Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 8 S
(1989) (1989) 4720 (1989)
(prohibits rebates) (prohibits sharing with (violation of S 4724
unlicensed) fins of 500 and
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 8 5 4499 revocation)
(1989)
(prohibits on Fret. Benefit Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 8 8
Soc.) 3703 (1989)
(violation of 5 3702
Vt. Star. Ann. tit. 8 S 3702 fins $500 and suspension
(1989) of license 1 yr.)
(agent or conpany on life ins.)
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 8 S
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 8 S 3861 4087 (1989)
(1989) (violation of 8 4088 -
(prohibits on casualty by agent fine of $200)
or corPany)
Vt. Star. Ann. tit, 8 S 4085
(1989)
(agent or coepany on health)
Virginia Va. Code Alm. S 38.2-509 (1990) Va. Code Ann. 5 38.2-1812 Va. Cods Arn. S 38.2-218
(prohibits rebates) (1990) (1990)
(prohibits sharing with (fine for con,. splitting
Va. Code S 38.2-4614 (1990) unlicensed) is fine; $1,000 if
(prohibits rebates to real unintentional)
estate agent on title ins.)
Va. Code Ann. 5 38.2-219
(1990)
(cease and desist order)
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West W. Va. Code 8 33-11-4 (1989) W. Va. Code 8 33-12-24 (1989) W. Va. Code 5 33-11-6
Virginia (prohibits rebates on life. (prohibits paying unlicensed) (1989)
accident and sickness ins.) (cease and desist)




Washington Wash. Rev. Code 5 48.30.140 Wash. Rev. Code 5 48.17.490 Wash. Rev. Code 8
(1989) (1989) 40.17.490 (1989)
(prohibits agent or company) (prohibits sharing with (sharing - revocation)
unlicensed)
Wash. Rev. Code 5 48.30.170 Wash. Rev. Code 5
(1989) 48.30.170 (1989)
(prohibits insured fIom (acceptances of rebate -
accepting rebate) zeduction in in.s. by at.
of rebate)
Wisconsin Wis. Star. Ann. 5 628.34 (West Wis. Star. Ann. 8 620.61 Wis. Star. Ann. 5 601.64
1980) (West 1988) (West 1988)
(agent or company prohibited) (prohibits sharing with (injunction and up to
unlicensed) $1,000/ violation and/or
revocation. suspension)
Wyoming Wyo. Star. S 26-13-110 (1989) Wyo. Stat. S 26-9-132 (1989) hyo. Star. 3 26-13-202
(prohibits in life, disability (prohibits sharing with (1989)
and annuity) unlicensed) (violation of rebate is
penalty in 8 26-1-107
Wyo. Star. S 26-13-113 (1989) which is fins and jail
(prohibits in property and tire)
casualty)
Wyo. Stat. 8 26-1-107
Wyo. Stat. Ann. S 26-29-138 (1989)
(1989) (civil penalties for viol.
(prohibits rebates in Frat. Ban. of ins. code)
Soc.) _______________ _____________
